Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act by Spencer, A. Benjamin
William & Mary Law School 
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans 
4-2019 
Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act 
A. Benjamin Spencer 
spencer@wm.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons 
Repository Citation 
Spencer, A. Benjamin, "Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act" (2019). Faculty Publications. 
1984. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1984 
Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs 
Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act 
A. Benjamin Spencer 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court promulgates rules of procedure (based on the proposals of subordinate 
rulemaking committees) pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. This statute empowers the Court 
to prescribe "general rules of practice and procedure," with the caveat that "[s]uch rules shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." The Act is supposed to stand as a real constraint 
on what rules or alterations thereof the subordinate rulemaking bodies will consider or propose, 
as well as on how the Court will choose to interpret any given codified Federal Rule. However, 
the Act has not-to date-been employed to invalidate a promulgated Federal Rule, leading one to 
wonder whether the Act's admonitions have any real purchase beyond keeping the judiciary from 
crafting rules that regulate primary conduct. But just how far can the Federal Rules go? Does 
the fact that none have been invalidated mean that the rulemakers and the Court have managed 
to adhere successfully to the Act's strictures? This Article suggests that the answer to that latter 
question is no. No rule has been invalidated because the Court has not yet been confronted with a 
live controversy over a rule that challenges its ability to avoid the issue by a saving interpretation. 
As a result, the Court has not had the opportunity to crystallize the precise contours of what kind 
of rules the Act does and does not allow it to prescribe. 
This Article takes up that enterprise, articulating an understanding of the Rules Enabling Act that 
will equip the Supreme Court with the ability to judge a rule's validity-and give the rulemakers 
much clearer guidance regarding the outer boundaries of their remit. Once such an understanding 
is in hand, a clear candidate for invalidation-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 15(c)(l)(C)­
comes to the fore. That rule-which (in some jurisdictions) eviscerates defendants' protection 
from liability, thereby disturbing their vested repose-alters substantive rights in ways the Act, 
properly understood, will not countenance. Other rules, such as FRCP 4(k) and 4(n), also fall afoul 
of the Rules Enabling Act if they are analyzed with a proper understanding of the Act's strictures. 
AUTHOR 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rules that govern the process of adjudication in our federal courts are 
prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court pursuant to a grant of authority contained in 
the Rules Enabling Act (REA), 1 which empowers the Court to craft "rules of practice 
and procedure," so long as those rules do not "abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right."2 It has rightly been claimed that the meaning of these 
admonitions has never clearly been articulated,3 and that the delineation of the 
REA's strictures remains opaque.4 Many scholars have wrestled with the REA's 
language in an attempt to understand the precise contours of its constraints.5 Of 
particular concern has been how we should understand the nature of its directive 
that the rules may not alter substantive rights: Is this an additional constraint or 
simply another way of stating that the rules must be merely procedural?6 
1. 28 u.s.c. § 2072 (2018). 
2. Id. §2072(a)-(b). 
3. See, e.g., Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking"Substantive Rights" (In the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 
7 4 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 47, 49 ( 1998) ("Despite the passage of more than six decades, neither the 
Court nor the commentators have managed to produce a workable definition of the 'substantive 
rights' limitation."). 
4. Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. RR, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1250 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(referring to "the difficulty in discerning which rules affected substantive private rights and duties 
and which did not," and remarking that " [w ]e continue to wrestle with this same distinction today 
in our decisions distinguishing between substantive and procedural rules both in diversity cases 
and under the Rules Enabling Act"). 
5. See StephenB. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA.L.REv. 1015, 1106-12 (1982) 
[hereinafter Burbank, Rules Enabling Act] (favoring a separation of powers rationale for the 
constraints of the REA); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed 
Opportunities a/ Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 52 (2010) (arguing that the REA calls for 
"moderate and restrained interpretation of Federal Rules that otherwise would impinge on the 
freedom of Congress or the States to pursue lawmaking aims that might traditionally be 
characterized as substantive"); Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and ''Procedure" in the Rules 
Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281 (1989) (suggesting a functional, context-specific approach to 
giving meaning to the terms "substance" and "procedure"); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth 
a/Erie, 87 HARv.L. REv. 693, 718-19 (1974) (insisting that the limitations of the REA are twofold: 
"Not only must a Rule be procedural; it must in addition abridge, enlarge or modify no substantive 
right."); Kelleher, supra note 3, at 108-21 (outlining a range of considerations rulemakers should 
use to determine whether the U.S. Supreme Court may regulate a matter under the REA); Martin H. 
Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the Procedural-Substantive Tension: A Lesson 
in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REv. 26, 30-31 (2008) (arguing for a "relaxed separation" 
interpretation of the two wings of the REA, under which "an incidental effect on substantive rights 
does not invalidate a rule"); Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial 
Rulemaking: A Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REv. 41 (1988) (arguing that separation of 
powers concerns should animate interpretation of the REA). 
6. Ely, supra note 5, at 719 ("Not only must a Rule be procedural; it must in addition abridge, enlarge 
or modify no substantiveright.");see also id. at719-20 (lamenting that, although the REA imposes 
two distinct requirements," [y]ou would never know it from the case law," and that the collapsing 
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The Court itself has struggled to present a clear picture of the REA as well. 
Although there have been instances in which the Court has gestured toward the idea 
that the REA's "shall not abridge" language must be taken seriously as its own 
constraint, there is a nagging sense that the diminutive view of the REA continues to 
hold sway, because the Supreme Court has yet to apply the REA to invalidate a 
codified Federal Rule. When confronted with circumstances in which a proposed 
understanding of a procedural rule threatened to transgress the constraints of the 
REA, the Court has salvaged the rule by interpreting it to avoid the offense,7 a move 
explicitly driven by the Court's sense that REA-imposed restrictions compelled that 
approach.8 Doing so made sense from a pragmatic perspective, because finding to 
the contrary would require a determination that "the Advisory Committee, [ the 
Supreme] Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in 
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional 
restrictions."9 However, in taking this approach, the Court has never had to address 
head-on precisely what it is that the REA prohibits. As a result, it has been easy to 
conclude that the REA loosely confines rulemaking to the procedural sphere, 
without giving much thought to the seemingly academic question of whether the 
REA' s "shall not abridge" provision adds anything to the analysis. 
of "the Act's two questions . . .  into one" has been "widely accepted by the literature and has 
continued to inform the Court's discussions"). Lower courts tend to gloss over any distinction, 
equating validity under the REA with a determination of whether a rule is procedural. See, e.g., 
Ringrosev. EngelbergHuller Co., 692 F.2d 403,408 (6th Cir.1982) ("The issueundertheEnabling 
Act is whether the rule 'really regulates procedure . . . .  "' ( quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 
464 (1965))). 
7. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities,Inc., 518 U.S. 415,427 n.7 (1996) ("Federal courts have 
interpreted the Federal Rules, however, with sensitivity to important state interests and regulatory 
policies."); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-52 (1980) (interpreting Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 3 to avoid a conflict with state statute of limitations period tolling provisions). 
8. See, e.g., Semtekint'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503 (2001) ("Indeed, such a rule 
would arguably violate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling Act: that the Rules ' shall 
not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."' ( quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000)) ). 
9. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471. Initial consideration of revisions or additions to the various Federal Rules 
are undertaken by a set of Advisory Committees, which submit their proposals to the U.S. Judicial 
Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (also known as the Standing 
Committee). Once the Standing Committee approves any proposed changes (which will only 
come after public notice and comment), they are reviewed for approval by the Judicial 
Conference. The Judicial Conference forwards the proposals to the U.S. Supreme Court, which­
after approving them-transmits them to Congress by May 1 of each year. Congress then has 
until December 1 of the same year to block the changes; barring such action, the changes 
take effect on December 1 of the year of congressional review. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2073-74 
(2018); About the Rulemaking Process: Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, U.S. 
CmJRTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/ about -rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking­
process-works/overview-bench-bar-and-public [https:/ /perma.cc/DU2D-56DG]. 
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This state of affairs has made Justice Harlan's prediction in Hanna v. Plumer10 
prophetic: 
So long as a reasonable man could characterize any duly adopted federal 
rule as "procedural," the Court, unless I misapprehend what is said, would 
have it apply no matter how seriously it frustrated a State's substantive 
regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its citizens. Since the 
members of the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this 
Court who formulated the Federal Rules are presumably reasonable men, 
it follows that the integrity of the Federal Rules is absolute.11 
Indeed, it has become common wisdom that the various Federal Rules are regarded 
as presumptively valid, 12 suggesting that no serious person would construe the REA 
to reach a contrary conclusion, given that the Supreme Court itself has never done 
so.13 Unfortunately, the implicit or explicit acceptance of this new "irrepressible 
myth" 14 has enabled us to become complacent with respect to whether each of the 
rules promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act are truly compliant with its 
terms. That is, the Court's failure to provide a rigorous articulation of the contours 
of the REA-including the degree to which its "shall not abridge" component should 
10. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
11. Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) ( emphasis added). 
12. See BurlingtonN. RR Co. v. Woods,480 U.S.1,6 (1987) (" [T]he study and approval given each 
proposed Rule by the Advisory Committee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court, and the 
statutory requirement that the Rule be reported to Congress for a period of review before taking 
effect . . .  give the Rules presumptive validity under both the constitutional and statutory 
constraints." ( citation omitted)); see also Kelleher, supra note 3, at 99 ("The Court not only failed 
to recognize any meaningful limits on its ability to promulgate Rules under the Rules Enabling 
Act, but also compounded its error by imbuing the Rules with a strong presumption of validity on 
the grounds that the Advisory Committee, the Court, and Congress, during the process of 
promulgating the Rules, have made a prima faciejudgment that the Rules do not violate the Act."); 
Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. 
REV. 311,364 (1980) ("[I]f a rule of civil procedure survives the multi-step process of being drafted 
by an Advisory Committee, approved by the Judicial Conference, approved by the Supreme 
Court, and not vetoed by Congress, it should be presumed not to violate substantive rights, 
particularly if the substantive effect of the rule is apparent on its face."). 
13. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 997, 1006-07 (1983) [hereinafter 
Burbank, Sanctions] ("As long as Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. remains law and the Court that 
promulgates Federal Rules and amendments has the final word on their validity, disputations 
regarding validity and invalidity are likely to be of purely academic interest . . . .  " (citation 
omitted)). 
14. In Professor Ely's seminal work on Erie, he took on the "irrepressible myth," then prevalent, that 
Erie was the single rubric through which all vertical choice-of-law problems must be analyzed. See 
Ely, supra note 5, at 697-98. The new "myth" is the notion that the REA simply imposes a loose 
requirement that rules be "procedural" and that the Federal Rules are impervious to attack 
thereunder. Id. 
Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act 659 
be given independent weight-has, in my view, enabled some rules to escape being 
detected as ultra vires judicial regulation. 
In this Article, I will offer my understanding of what constraints the REA 
imposes on Supreme Court rulemaking, hopefully providing some clarity regarding 
the basic and distinctive constraints that the "rules of procedure" and "shall not 
abridge" components of the REA impose. In brief, the REA' s underlying purpose of 
policing the boundaries between what Congress and the Court may regulate via 
prospective, supervisory regulation 15 yields an appreciation that procedural rules 
are restricted to addressing to the manner of adjudication, while substantive rights 
pertain to our primary interactions with one another and with governments. With 
this understanding of the REA in hand, it appears that at least two of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (my particular bailiwick)16 cannot stand up to scrutiny, an 
unfortunate but important determination to make.17 In the process of uncovering 
these defects, my hope is that the Supreme Court and its subordinate rulemaking 
bodies are able to have much more clarity about what can and cannot be done when 
prescribing the rules that govern "practice and procedure" in our federal courts. 
I. THEADMONITIONOFTHERULESENABLINGACT 
What, exactly, is it that the REA permits and proscribes? Here is the current 
version of the REA in its entirety: 18 
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general19 rules 
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United 
1 5. See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1106 ("Nothing could be clearer from the pre-1934 
historyoftheRulesEnablingAct than thattheprocedure/substancedichotomyin the first two sentences 
was intended to allocate lawmaking power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress."). 
16. I currently serve as a member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, which considers and proposes 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The views expressed in this Article are myowu 
1 7. This Article makes no attempt to evaluate the validity of other rules promulgated pursuant to the REA, 
which include the Federal Rules of Appellate and Criminal Procedure, as well as some components of 
the Federal Rules ofEvidence ( other components of the Federal Rules ofEvidence are directly enacted 
by Congress). However, the REA analysis I propound is equally applicable to this other body of 
regulations. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure are promulgated pursuant to a distinct­
though similarly worded-statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2075. 
18. Subsections (a) and (b) of this version of the REA were enacted in 1988. Judicial Improvements and 
Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401(a), 102 Stat 4642, 4648-50 (1988). Subsection (c) was 
added in 1990. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat 5115. The original 
version of the Act was enacted in 1934. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat 1064. 
1 9. I will not, in this Article, explore the import of the term "general." To some it may appear to be an 
instruction that the rules must be of general applicability to all cases in the federal courts, that is, 
trans-substantive rules. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of "General Rules", 
2009 Wis. L. REv. 535, 541 ("One of the foundational assumptions of modem American 
procedure is that the Rules Enabling Act's reference to 'general rules' forecloses the promulgation 
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States district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges 
thereof) and courts of appeals. 
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. 
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after 
such rules have taken effect. 20 
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the 
purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title. 21 
From this text, the principal command of the REA appears to be twofold: (1) The 
rules prescribed by the Court must be rules of "practice and procedure"22 ( or 
evidence) and (2) they may not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."23 
of different prospective rules for cases that involve different bodies of substantive law."). I am 
sympathetic toward that view, although it is mainly policy reasons that advise adherence to this 
constraint. However, although whether the REA prohibits rules that are limited to certain kinds 
of cases is an interesting question, it is one that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
20. The second sentence of subparagraph (b) is a supersession clause; I do not address this provision 
in this Article. It is worth noting, however, that one commentator has suggested that the 
limitations on the Court's rulemaking authority under the REA-namely that its rules may not 
abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights-mean that any rule that is true to those limitations 
will not supersede any substantive laws. See Kelleher, supra note 3, at 87 ("[S]tatutes with a 
substantive purpose, particularly those not enacted as a part of the Rules, are not subject to 
supersession, as a Court-promulgated Rule in conflict with the statute would impermissibly affect 
a substantive right within the meaning of the REA."). I offer no views on this analysis here. 
21. 28 u.s.c. §2072 (2018). 
22. As Professor Ely stated it, "the Act begins with a checklist approach-anything that relates to 
process, writs, pleadings, motions, or to practice and procedure generally, is authorized; anything 
else is not." Ely, supra note 5, at 718. 
23. See id. at 719 ("The Act therefore contains . . .  limitations of both the checklist and enclave variety. 
Not only must a Rule be procedural; it must in addition abridge, enlarge or modify no substantive 
right."). The Sibbach case has been criticized for collapsing these two distinct components of the 
REA into one. Id. at 719-20 (noting that in Sibbach "the Act's two questions were collapsed into 
one: 'The test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure . . .  .' This construction has been 
widely accepted by the literature and has continued to inform the Court's discussions."). 
Although the Court remedied this error in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), Justice Scalia 
resurrected it in his plurality opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010), when he wrote: 
Congress has undoubted power to supplant state law, and undoubted power to 
prescribe rules for the courts it has created, so long as those rules regulate matters 
"rationally capable of classification " as procedure. In the Rules Enabling Act, 
Congress authorized this Court to promulgate rules of procedure subject to its 
review, but with the limitation that those rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right." 
We have long held that this limitation means that the Rule must "really 
regulat[e] procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties 
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for 
disregard or infraction of them." The test is not whether the Rule affects a litigant's 
substantive rights; most procedural rules do. What matters is what the Rule itself 
regulates: If it governs only "the manner and the means" by which the litigants' 
Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act 661 
Informed by others who have sought to clarify the meaning of the REA before me, I 
endeavor to provide a sketch of the constraints that the REA imposes below. 
A. "Rules of Practice or Procedure" 
Most of the scholarly and judicial discussion of the REA posits a basic 
substance-procedure divide: Something is either a matter of procedure or it is a 
matter of substance.24 I want to complicate that a bit by arguing that there are 
multiple categories of rules beyond this duo. 
We turn first to the REA' s conferral25 on the Supreme Court of the power to 
prescribe "rules of practice or procedure."26 Everything that we know about the 
motivation and purpose behind the REA-thanks in large measure to Professor 
rights are "enforced," it is valid; ifit alters "the rules of decision by which [the] court 
will adjudicate [those] rights," it is not. 
Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., 559 U.S. at 406-07 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (citations 
omitted) ( quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472). See also id. at 411 ("Sibbach adopted and applied a rule 
with a single criterion: whether the Federal Rule 'really regulates procedure."'). 
24. See, e.g., Burbank, Rules EnablingAct, supra note 5, at 1113 (referring to "the procedure/substance 
dichotomy in the Act's first two sentences"); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 
(1988) ("Except at the extremes, the terms 'substance' and 'procedure' precisely describe very little 
except a dichotomy, and what they mean in a particular context is largely determined by the 
purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn."). 
25. On the question of whether Congress has conferred this power on the Supreme Court or merely 
recognized a power that the Court inherently possesses, see, for example, Kelleher, supra note 3, 
at 62-63 ("The questions of what, if any, inherent authority the judicial branch has to regulate 
procedure and whether that inherent authority includes authority to promulgate procedural 
Rules in the absence of a congressional delegation has not been so clearly decided."). Although the 
Supreme Court's authority to prescribe its own rules of practice is unquestionably inherent to its 
judicial power, it is less clear (if not dubious) that the Court's judicial power inherently includes 
the authority to prescribe prospective, supervisory rules for the inferior federal courts that Congress 
creates. That said, in the absence of Congressional rulemaking or the authorization thereof, each 
federal court would have to determine its own procedures as a prerequisite to exercising its 
adjudicatory role. One could imagine that in such a world, the Supreme Court, through the 
Judicial Conference, might develop a set of rules that each federal court could then choose whether 
to adopt. This would not guarantee uniformity, but likely would be wholly consistent with the 
scope of the inherent rulemaking power that each court has for itself Congress's grant, to the 
Supreme Court, of the authority to prescribe prospective, supervisory rules operative in the federal 
courts thus appears to be the delegation of legislative power. This insight will be relevant to my 
construction of the REA below in Subpart II.B. 
26. I will regard the terms "practice" and "procedure " as largely synonymous, as my perusal of their 
usage throughout Supreme Court jurisprudence reflects their interchangeable meaning. Indeed, 
the heading of Section 2072 is "Rules of procedure and evidence; power to prescribe"; Sections 
2073 and 207 4 also refer only to "Rules of procedure and evidence," without any reference 
to the word "practice," which strongly buttresses the idea that "practice" and "procedure" are to 
be regarded as synonymous. See Fla. Dep't ofRevenuev. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 
(2008) ("[S]tatutory titles and section headings 'are tools available for the resolution of a doubt 
about the meaning of a statute."' ( quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516,528 (2002) )). 
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Stephen B. Burbank's extensive treatment of the subject27 -indicates that the Act's 
reference to "procedure" and "substantive rights" was "understood to demarcate the 
spheres of lawmaking appropriate for the Supreme Court acting as rulemaker and 
for Congress," "foreclos [ing] the creation in court rules of rights that would 
approximate the substantive law in their effect on person or property."28 Knowing 
this guides our understanding of what "rules of practice and procedure" must be: 
Procedural rules are rules pertaining to the internal administration of the judicial 
process, that is, "claim-processing rules."29 They stand opposed to rules that govern 
primary conduct, which are the province of Congress and the states. 
An early congressional pronouncement described procedure as "the forms 
and modes of proceeding in suits."30 The Supreme Court refined this category in 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.3 1 when it defined "procedure" as "the judicial process for 
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly 
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them."32 In an 
earlier case-cited by congressional supporters of a predecessor bill to the REA-the 
Court had remarked, "The function of rules is to regulate the practice of the court 
and to facilitate the transaction of its business."33 Filling this in further, Professor 
John Hart Ely listed among procedural rules those pertaining to "the form of 
pleadings, orderof proof, time limits on responsive pleadings, and the method by which 
an adversary is given notice."34 What these examples and the Court's definition in 
27. See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5. 
28. Id. at 1 107, 1 1 14. 
29. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965) 
( describing procedural rules as "housekeeping rules"). 
30. Act ofMay 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276. 
3 1 .  312 U.S. 1 (1941). 
32. Id. at 14. 
33. Wash.-S. Navigation Co. v. Bait. & Phila. Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924). This case was 
cited in the Minority Views section of the 1928 Senate Report to S. 2061, the bill that would later 
become the REA in 1934 ( after having been stymied in 1928). The supporters of the bill sought to 
assuage opponents' concerns over the authority conferred by the proposed legislation by quoting 
the above language from Washington-Southern, and also writing (in their own voice), "Matters of 
jurisdiction and of substantive right are clearly within the power of the legislature. These are not 
to be affected. It can not be too strongly emphasized that the general rules of court contemplated 
under this bill will deal only with the details of the operation of the judicial machine." S. REP. No. 
70-440, pt. 2, at 16 (1928). See also Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1092-98 
(discussing this legislative history). 
34. Ely, supra note 5, at 715-16. I depart from Professor Ely when he defines a procedural rule as "one 
designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes." Id. at 724. The objective of rendering the dispute resolution process fair-which Ely 
elaborates as being inclusive of doing things a particular way ''because it is thought to be more 
likely to get at the truth, or better calculated to give the parties a fair opportunity to present their 
sides of the story," Id. at 725-is not essential to rendering a rule procedural. A rule can be 
procedural without regard to its concern for such ends. See Carrington, supra note 5, at 308 (" [A] 
Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act 663 
Sibbach reveal is that procedural rules concern the manner in which a court 
processes a claim.35 
That said, for these to be rules at all-in the sense that they have to be followed­
there also must be related regulations or doctrines that indicate the consequences of 
noncompliance, such as the dismissal of one's claim, the imposition of a fine, or 
the entry of a default judgment.36 These too are procedural rules, because they relate 
to and facilitate judicial processes.37 Similarly, rules pertaining to qualifying and 
permitting advocates to represent litigants before the court-and rules regulating 
advocates' conduct in that capacity-relate to the adjudicatory process and fit 
comfortably within the realm of the procedural.38 
Helpful as the above definition of a procedural rule may be, the category may 
be more deeply appreciated by describing precisely what a rule of procedure is not. 
The most apparent thing that a rule of procedure is not is a rule of evidence. The 
modern REA treats "rules of practice and procedure" and "rules of evidence" as two 
different things. This is not by accident. The original version of the REA omitted any 
reference to rules of evidence, mentioning only rules concerning "the forms of 
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil 
actions at law."39 The original Advisory Committee debated whether it had the 
authority to touch on matters pertaining to evidence.40 It ultimately crafted rules 
rule is functionally one of'practice and procedure,' within the meaning of the first sentence, if the 
rule pertains to the operation of the federal courts and is integrated in a system generally applicable 
to all civil actions and suitably designed to achieve 'just, speedy, and inexpensive' 
determinations."). 
35. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (describing 
procedural rules as "rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted"); see also Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) ("A rule is substantive rather than procedural ifit alters the 
range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes. In contrast, rules that regulate only 
the manner of determining the defendant's culpability are procedural." (citations omitted)); 
Palmerv. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 1 17  (1943) ("Rule 8(c) coversonlythe mannerofpleading. The 
question of the burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law which 
federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases must apply." ( citation omitted)). 
36. See, e.g., FED. R Civ. P. 3 7(b) (2) (A) (i)-( vii) (providing for the imposition ofsanctions in response 
to a litigant's failure to obey a court's discovery orders). 
3 7. If the rules policing compliance with the judicial process became overly punitive in a manner not 
reasonably connected with furthering a court's procedural objectives, the impact on substantive 
rights might be impermissible, as discussed further in Subpart LB.2. 
38. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) ("[T]he Court has held that a federal court has 
the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it." ( citing 
Ex parteBurr, 22 U.S. 529, 531 (1824))). 
39. RulesEnabling Actof1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. 
40. See Foreword to ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES 
OF CNIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUFREME COURT 
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, at xvii (1936) ("There is some difference of opinion in the 
Committee as to the extent to which the statute authorizes the Court to maize rules dealing with 
evidence. We have touched the subject as lightly as possible."). 
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relating to obtaining and presenting evidence,4' as well as rules concerning 
admissibility42 and authentication,43 suggesting they saw evidentiary rules as falling 
within the charge to craft rules of procedure. 
However, when a subsequent Advisory Committee proposed the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, Congress balked, blocking the rules44 and taking it upon itself to 
enact rules of evidence legislatively.45 The House Report supporting this legislation 
explained why Congress had blocked the evidence rules proposed by the Advisory 
Committee: " [R] ecognizing that rules of evidence are in large measure substantive 
in their nature or impact, the Subcommittee and the Full Committee concluded they 
were not within the scope of the enabling acts which authorize the Supreme Court to 
promulgate rules of 'practice and procedure."'46 Based on an extensive review of the 
41 . Rules 26 through 3 7 and 45 addressed discovery, depositions, and subpoenaing witnesses. FED. R 
av. P. 26, 37, 45 (1939). 
42. Original Rule 43( a) provided: 
(a) FORM AND ADMISSIBILlTY. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken 
orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules. All evidence shall be 
admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under 
the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States on the 
hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of 
general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is held. In any case, 
the statute or rule which favors the reception of the evidence governs and the 
evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient method prescribed 
in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein made. The competency 
of a witness to testify shall be determined in like manner. 
FED.R av. P. 43(a) (1939). 
43. Original Rule 44 prescribed the standards for authentication of documents. FED. R Cw. P. 44 
(1939). 
44. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9 (entitled, in part, "An Act to Promote the 
Separation of Constitutional Powers"). 
45. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 ("An Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for 
Certain Courts and Proceedings."). 
46. H.R REP. No. 93-650, at 7076 (1973). There is additional evidence that Congress had this issue on 
its mind when it blocked the Rules of Evidence from taking effect. In the House Report 
accompanying the blocking legislation, one finds the following: 
Witnesses . . .  have brought to the Committee's attention substantial questions for 
congressional consideration: 
(1) Are there constitutional impediments to the promulgation of Rules of 
Evidence by the Supreme Court, rules which may impinge on state-created 
substantive rights and infringe on the constitutional separation of powers? 
(2) Are the Rules ofEvidence within the purview of the authority granted 
the Court by the enabling acts? Justice William 0. Douglas, dissenting 
from the Court action, said he doubted that they were. 
[I]t has become clear there is enough controversy wrapped up in the 168 
pages of rules and Advisory Committee notes that the rules should not 
be permitted to become effective without an affirmative act of Congress, 
and then, only to the extent and with such amendments, as the Congress shall 
approve. 
Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act 665 
legislative history surrounding the drafting and adoption of the Rules Enabling Act 
of 1934, Professor Burbank concluded, "Congress was faithful to the original 
understanding in refusing to acquiesce in the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in 
1973."47 According to Burbank's research, although matters pertaining to "the mode 
of taking and obtaining evidence" were within the procedural remit given to the 
Supreme Court, rules "regulating the admissibility of evidence" were not.48 Thus, 
first in 197549 and then in 1988, Congress crafted legislation to provide-as the REA 
does today-that the Supreme Court may prescribe "rules of evidence,"50 with the 
caveat that such rules pertaining to "an evidentiary privilege" may only take effect by 
an Act of Congress.51 
Because the authority of the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of evidence is 
now explicit, drawing a distinction between a rule of procedure and a rule of 
evidence has no consequences for a rule's validity under the REA, since either are 
permissible. The point of drawing this distinction is that rules are not confined to the 
substantive-versus-procedural dyad. There are other types of rules that are neither 
"procedural" nor "substantive". A rule governing what is admissible into evidence is a 
rule of evidence, not a rule of procedure or a substantive rule; rules of evidence are 
their own category. On the other hand, rules governing how information may be 
collected and presented to the court are rules of procedure, for they pertain to the 
manner of adjudication. Therefore, "procedural" cannot simply mean "non­
substantive." This level of precision is necessary when considering whether a 
particular Federal Rule can be fairly characterized as procedural under the REA. 
A procedural rule may also be contrasted with another kind of rule: a rule of 
decision. A rule of decision is-simply put-a legal rule that determines the 
H.RREP.No. 93-52, at3-4 (1973); seealsoS.REP.No. 93-14, at2 n.2 (1973) ("In addition,it should 
be noted that this bill would not affect the power of the Supreme Court to issue rules of evidence 
in the future, assuming that such power already exists. If the Court does not have the power, 
then, of course, this bill would not grant it. If the Court does, this bill does not speak to the 
continuation of that power. On the controversy over the power to issue rules of evidence, see 
the dissenting view of Mr. Justice Douglas to the order of Nov. 20, 1972, promulgating the 
proposed rules of evidence."). 
4 7. Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1 138. 
48. Id. at 1 141-43; accord 409 U.S. 1 132, 1 132-33 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("I doubt if rules of 
evidence are within the purview of the statute under which we are authorized to submit proposed 
Rules to Congress. . . . I can find no legislative history that rules ofevidence were to be included in 
'practice and procedure' as used in § 2072."). 
49. ActofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, §2(a)(l ) ,88 Stat. 1926, 1948 (amending Title 28 of the U.S. 
Code to create Section 2076, which empowered the Supreme Court "to prescribe amendments to 
the Federal Rules ofEvidence"). 
50. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §401 (a), 102 Stat. 4642, 
4648 (1988). 
5 1 .  28 U.S.C. §2074(b) (2018). 
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outcome, on the merits, with respect to a particular issue or matter that has been 
presented for adjudication.52 Another way of phrasing it is a rule of decision is one 
that supplies the criteria for deciding a litigant's entitlement to relief 53 Yet another 
way of describing rules of decision would be as those legal rules that define or 
delineate the duties, rights, and obligations that govern our lives and form the 
foundation for assessing liability and determining the compensatory, punitive, and 
remedial consequences that flow therefrom.54 Congress has-through the Rules of 
Decision Act-commanded that state law supply this kind of rule in cases where 
the U.S. Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States do not otherwise 
require or provide.55 Rules of decision are what many would rightly refer to as the 
"substantive law," although I will abjure use of that term (using "rules of decision" 
instead) because of its attendant baggage and imprecision.56 
Subsumed within rules of decision are rules governing the resolution of 
conflicts among rules of decision. In federal court, the admonition to apply state law 
52. See Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (indicating that Erie interpreted the Rules of 
Decision Act to ensure that "so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation," in diversity 
cases the outcome "should be substantially the same . . .  as it would be if tried in a State court"). 
The outcome that I refer to here is not the ultimate macro-outcome of the case-which, as is well 
known, may be determined by many different kinds of rules-but rather the micro-outcome 
of how an issue presented for adjudication is decided. An example would be a legal rule 
establishing the duty of care a proprietor owes to a trespasser, or those rules that determine 
whether one's behavior rises to the level of recklessness. 
53. See Ely, supra note 5, at 712 ( conceiving of rules of decision as those "rules by which the lawsuit 
was to be determined"). 
54. See, e.g., Kelso v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-01286-T-EAK-TGW, 2010 WL 2889882, at *1 
(M.D. Fla. July 21, 2010) ("Substantive law prescribes rights and duties, while procedural law 
concerns the means and methods to enforce those rights and duties."); Hadlich v. Am. Mail Line, 
82 F. Supp. 562,563 (N.D. Cal. 1949) ("Essentially venue is an incidence of procedure. It is a part 
of that body oflaw which bounds and delineates the forum and the manner and mode of enforcing 
a litigant's rights. It is distinguishable from and is not within the field of law, known as substantive, 
which recognizes, creates and defines rights and liabilities and causes of action."). Professor Ely's 
conclusion that "state rules controlling such things as burden of proof, presumptions, and 
sufficiency of evidence should be followed where they differ from the federal court's usual 
practice," Ely, supra note 5, at 714, fits comfortably within my description of a rule of decision, as 
the rules that he cites-burden of proof, presumptions, and sufficiency of the evidence-all 
pertain to the conditions under which liability may be properly assessed. 
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018);Erie RR Co. v. Tompkins,304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). TheRules ofDecision 
Act was first enacted by Congress as section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Judiciary Act of l 789, 
ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92. 
56. See Guar. Tr. Co. , 326 U.S. at 108 ("Neither 'substance' nor 'procedure' represents the same 
invariants. Each implies different variables depending upon the particular problem for which it is 
used. And the different problems are only distantly related at best, for the terms are in common 
use in connection with situations turning on such different considerations as those that are 
relevant to questions pertaining to ex post facto legislation, the impairment of the obligations of 
contract, the enforcement of federal rights in the State courts and the multitudinous phases of the 
conflict of laws." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). I cannot avoid, however, the term 
"substantive rights," which I will engage below. See infra Subpart LB. 
Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act 667 
as the rules of decision necessitates a determination of which state's law to apply. 
This determination itself is controlled by the rules of the state where the relevant 
district court is located.57 The Supreme Court reached that conclusion by 
application of the Erie doctrine: Given the tight connection with "local policies" that 
a state's conflicts rules have, the subversion of such rules in favor of " an independent 
'general law' of conflict of laws" crafted by federal courts would "do violence to the 
principle of uniformity within a state upon which the [Erie] decision is based."58 As 
a result, conflicts rules-at least so far as they control the selection of which rule of 
decision to apply-are not within the realm of the procedural, but rather are 
appurtenant to the rules of decision category.59 
Where do jurisdictional rules fit (if they do) within this schema? If 
"jurisdiction" is taken to mean a court's authority or capacity to hear a case, 60 then­
at first blush-jurisdiction may appear to pertain to the process whereby underlying 
rights and duties are adjudicated. Upon closer inspection, however, jurisdictional 
rules do not to bear on the manner in which a court resolves a matter, but instead 
concern whether that court has cognizance of the matter in the first place. 
Jurisdictional rules thus differ from procedural rules: They are not internal claim­
processing rules, but metarules that provide prerequisites to the court engaging in 
the adjudicatory enterprise at all. 61 Rules governing jurisdiction also are distinct from 
rules of decision, as the latter concern the criteria for resolution of a claim-its 
57. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S.487,496 (1941). 
58. Id. 
59. Relevant to the discussion of the "shall not abridge " provision of the REA below, infra Subpart LB, 
the Court's recognition of the substantive tenor of conflicts rules indicates that any rule 
promulgated by the Supreme Court that purported to govern such matters would necessarily 
"abridge, enlarge or modify" a substantive right. 
60. Granting that "' [j]urisdiction,' it has been observed, 'is a word of many, too many, meanings,"' 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) ( citation omitted), it means at 
least what I have described. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667,671 (1950) 
("When concerned as we are with the power of the inferior federal courts to entertain litigation 
within the restricted area to which the U.S. Constitution and Acts of Congress confine them, 
'jurisdiction' means the kinds of issues which give right of entrance to federal courts."); see also 
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428,435 (2011 ), revg Henderson v. Shinseki, 
589 F.3d 1201 (2009) ("We have urged that a rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless 
it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction."). 
61. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2018) (distinguishing section 2(b) of the Gun Lake Trust 
Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014)-which it found to be a 
jurisdictional rule-from "a 'claim-processing rule,' like a filing deadline or an exhaustion 
requirement, that requires the parties to 'take certain procedural steps at certain specified times."' 
(quoting Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428,435 (2011))); Bowles v. Russell, 
551 U.S. 205, 210 (2007) ("[S]everal of our recent decisions have undertaken to clarify the 
distinction between claims-processing rules and jurisdictional rules."); Kon trick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 
443,454 (2004) (distinguishing "claim-processing rules" from prescriptions that "delineate what 
cases bankruptcy courts are competent to adjudicate"). 
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"substantive adequacy''62-whereas jurisdictional rules are addressed to the power of 
the court to entertain it.63 Put simply, jurisdictional rules tell a court whether it has 
adjudicatory power (the power to resolve), rules of decision determine the 
resolution of matters presented for adjudication on their merits ( the standards for 
resolution), and rules of practice and procedure tell a court the manner in which the 
adjudication will unfold (the method of resolution). 
I am well aware that the concept of "jurisdiction" is much more fraught than I 
have presented it to be.64 Refining jurisdiction as a concept is not central to my 
purpose here, however. I assume only that there are some rules properly called 
"jurisdictional" which pertain to whether a given court may adjudicate a dispute in a 
way that binds certain parties and is respected by other jurisdictions. My concern is 
whether-pursuant to the REA-the Supreme Court can prescribe such rules, as 
"rules of practice and procedure." 
The answer is clearly "no" for subject -matter jurisdiction,65 for the Supreme Court 
has stated, "Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter 
jurisdiction,"66 pursuant to its constitutional authority to "ordain and establish" 
inferior federal courts. 67 Explicit recognition of this limitation is supplied in Rule 82 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads, in pertinent part, "These rules 
do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts . . . .  "68 
62. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 504 (2006). 
63. Republic Nat'! Bank ofMiami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that jurisdictional statutes "speak to the power of 
the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties"). 
64. See generally Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Ef ects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619 (2017) (discussing the 
"identity crisis" faced by the term "jurisdiction" and referencing other scholars who have explored 
the concept). 
65. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213 ("[T]he notion of 'subject-matter' jurisdiction obviously extends to 
'classes of cases . . .  falling within a court's adjudicatory authority."' ( quoting Eberhart v. United 
States, 546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005))). 
66. Hamerv. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017) (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. 
at452)). 
67. Lockertyv. Phillips, 319U.S. 182, 187 (l943); see alsoKontrick, 540 U.S. at452 (citing U.S. CONST. 
art. III, § 1 ). Although I have previously mused about whether the language and history of Article 
III support this view of congressional power, see A. Benjamin Spencer, The Judicial Power and the 
Inferior Federal Courts: Bcploring the Constitutional Vesting Thesis, 46 GA. L. REv. 1 (201 1 ), there 
is no prospect that those musings will ever have any sway, see id. at 66 ("Ultimately the traditional 
view challenged here-that Congress has authority over inferior federal court jurisdiction-is too 
entrenched and too relied upon to doubt at this late stage."). 
68. FED.R Civ. P. 82;see also Owen Equip. &Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437U.S. 365, 370 (1978) ("[I]tis 
axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal 
jurisdiction."); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (noting "the inability ofa court, by 
rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute"); Wash.-S. Navigation Co. v. Bait. 
& Phila. Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924) ("But no rule of court can enlarge or restrict 
jurisdiction."); Venner v. Great N. Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 24, 35 (1908) ("The jurisdiction of the circuit 
court is prescribed by laws enacted by Congress in pursuance of the Constitution, and this court 
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However, can the same be said for personal jurisdiction? Might a rule be 
considered to be one of "practice and procedure" if it addresses "jurisdictional" 
matters of that kind? Answering this question requires specifying what personal 
jurisdiction is really about:69 the authority of a court to exercise power over a 
particular entity or person and render a binding determination of their rights. This 
seems jurisdictional in the sense I have thus far described. 70 Although individual due 
process rights demand that a court have territorial jurisdiction before it may render 
a binding judgment against a party,7' whether a court has such authority over a 
person (or property) ultimately is a function of his or her connection to the 
geographical territory over which the court's sponsoring sovereign wields control. 72 
In the absence of any such connection, whatever that court does with respect to such 
persons or property may be ignored, or at least challenged on that ground.73 May 
rules of "procedure" concern themselves with the authority of a court to render 
binding judgments and still be properly considered "procedural"? 
by its rules has no power to increase or diminish the jurisdiction thus created . . . .  "). The inability 
of court rules to define federal subject-matter jurisdiction does not mean that such rules cannot 
address how the federal courts undertake the subject -matter jurisdiction determination; whether 
a court has jurisdiction is beyond the rules but the method it uses to make that call is not. 
69. Obviously, this topic has been the subject of extensive debate, with most believing that the Court 
has provided insufficient clarity on this score. I have already offered my views of what personal 
jurisdiction should be about and will not rehash that discussion here. See A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. On. L. REv. 617 (2006). However, in my 
discussion below of Rule 4(k) and Rule 4(n), see infra Subpart II.B, I will offer more detail about 
the interaction between the Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and these rules to the 
extent it bears on determining their validity under the REA. 
70. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 526 (1988) (" [T]his Court has recognized that the 
individual interest protected is in 'not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with 
which [the defendant] has established no meaningful "contacts, ties, or relations." "' (quoting 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985)) ). 
71 . Ins. Corp. oflr. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 ( 1982) ("The requirement 
that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause."); 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) ("[P]roceedings in a court of justice to determine the 
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not 
constitute due process of law."). 
72. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) ("[R]estrictions on 
personal jurisdiction 'are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant 
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States."' 
(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,251 (1958))); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 
U.S. 873, 880 (2011) ( opinion ofKennedy, J.) ("As a general rule, neither statute nor judicial decree 
may bind strangers to the State . . . .  A court may subject a defendant to judgment only when the 
defendant has sufficient contacts with the sovereign 'such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." "' ( quoting Int'! Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945))). 
73. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 706 ("A defendant is always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, 
risk a default judgment, and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral 
proceeding."). 
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There are two distinct ways that a rule might address personal jurisdiction. The 
first way would be through a rule that articulated the circwnstances under which a 
court could exercise jurisdiction over persons or property. The second way would 
be a rule that articulated how a litigant could appear in court to challenge a court's 
territorial jurisdiction without having such conduct be treated as grounds for the 
court's assertion of jurisdiction.74 A rule of the first kind does not meet my definition 
of a rule of procedure.75 Such a rule determines whether a court may adjudicate a 
matter, not the manner in which it may do so. 
However, a rule specifying the method a court may use to make its 
jurisdictional determination is a rule of procedure: It guides the court's 
decisionmaking process rather than provides criteria that determine jurisdiction 
itself 76 For example, Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-which 
provides that one may challenge personal jurisdiction by appearing in court and 
filing a motion to dismiss in response to a complaint-is a procedural rule because it 
does not address whether there is jurisdiction but how a litigant may raise a 
jurisdictional challenge.77 To the extent a rule of this kind extends jurisdictional 
immunity as a component of this process, as to a litigant appearing only to contest 
jurisdiction, this immunity can fairly be seen as a necessary concomitant of the 
court's undertaking the jurisdictional inquiry at all, not a feature that robs the rule of 
its status as one of "practice and procedure." 
Similarly, related rules that articulate the consequences of failing to adhere to 
the requirements for such jurisdictional immunity-such as Rule 12(h)'s 
admonition that personal jurisdiction challenges not raised initially are waived78-
are still rules of practice and procedure. They simply announce that the 
7 4. See, e.g., FED. R Civ. P. 12 (permitting personal jurisdiction to be challenged prior to filing an 
answer, thus enabling a litigant to appear without submitting to the court's jurisdiction generally); 
Segalis v. RoofDepot USA, LLC, 178 So. 3d 83, 85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) ("The law is clear and 
well-established that a simple notice of appearance by counsel does not constitute a general 
appearance by the client and does not waive the client's claims as to lack of jurisdiction or denial 
of due process."). 
75. The Supreme Court appears to concur in this conclusion, having stated " [c]larity would be 
facilitated if courts and litigants used the label 'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but 
only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons 
(personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's adjudicatory authority." Kon trick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 
443,455 (2004). Subdivisions (k) and (n) ofRule 4 are more thoroughly analyzedin relation to the 
REA in Subpart ILB, infra. 
76. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 707 (" [T]he manner in which the court determines whether it has 
personal jurisdiction may include a variety of legal rules and presumptions, as well as 
straightforward factfinding . . . .  [T]he mere use of procedural rules does not in itself violate the 
defendant's due process rights."). 
77. FED.R Clv.P.12(b)(2), (g), (h). 
78. FED. R Clv. P. 12(h). 
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jurisdictional "state of nature" external to such rules (i.e. that voluntarily appearing 
in court subjects one to its jurisdiction) applies if the requirements internal to the 
rules are not met. 
Considered in terms of the typical order of a court proceeding, we have touched 
on rules that determine whether a court may entertain a matter (jurisdictional rules), 
rules that prescribe the manner or method the court must use as it adjudicates a 
matter (procedural rules), rules that govern what material may be considered in 
adjudication ( evidentiary rules), and rules that supply the criteria the court must use 
to resolve a matter one way or another (rules of decision). 
One final category of rules must be noted: rules of redress.79 Once adjudication 
concludes with a finding that the claimant has presented and proven a valid claim, 
the court is in the position to provide the claimant with some type of relief, which 
may be monetary or equitable in nature. The law that informs the court of what relief 
it is authorized to give may be described as rules of redress-those rules that 
articulate the consequences of a proven legal transgression. Although courts have 
inherent authority to determine the consequences of law violations in the context of 
particular adjudications, the promulgation of prospective, supervisory rules 
concerning such matters-at least at the federal level-would seem to be a 
quintessentially legislative, rather than judicial, act.80 The entitlements one has 
under the law in the wake of a determination of another's liability do not pertain to 
the method of adjudication, but to rights and obligations that flow from a judgment 
reached at the conclusion of the adjudicatory process. 
79. I am deliberately avoiding the term "remedy" here. There are times when the term "remedy" is 
used to mean redress or relief (for example, an injunction or monetary damages). See, e.g., Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 343 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (referring to "damages" as "the law's traditional remedy for . . .  tortious injury"). 
However, there are other times when courts use the term "remedial" to refer to something akin to 
justiciability, that is, a rule that addresses whether a substantive right violation can be judicially 
addressed. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1979): 
Section 1985(3), by contrast, creates no rights. It is a purely remedial statute, 
providing a civil cause of action when some otherwise defined federal right-to 
equal protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the laws-is 
breached by a conspiracy in the manner defined by the section. . . . The only 
question here, therefore, is whether the rights created by Title VII may be asserted 
within the remedial framework of § 1985(3). 
Id. As used in Novotny, remedial means providing a federal avenue for vindicating rights defined 
elsewhere. "Remedial" in this sense is closer to a jurisdictional rule, but not quite that. To avoid 
such haziness, I am choosing to capture this category of rules with the term redress. There likely is 
a separate category of rules, distinct from "rules of redress" and "jurisdictional rules," that capture 
what is meant by a "remedial statute " as used by the Court in Novotny. The important point is that 
rules pertaining to such matters would not be fairly characterized as "procedural." 
80. Cf Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 ( 1989) ( describing as a "legislative responsibility" 
the task of "establishing minimum and maximum penalties for every crime"). 
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To summarize, a "rule of practice or procedure" concerns the method a court 
uses to adjudicate matters presented to it. Such a rule may not prescribe the rules that 
govern how a court determines a matter on its merits. Neither may a rule of 
procedure address whether a court may adjudicate a matter at all or exercise 
authority over particular persons or property-although it may prescribe the 
process a court uses to determine its authority in a given case. Finally, rules of 
procedure may not prescribe the range of permissible consequences of law 
violations. 
B. "ShallNotAbridge" 
In addition to being confined to procedural rules, the REA next tells us that 
rules promulgated thereunder may not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right." This text raises two questions. First, and most importantly, does it provide a 
separate and meaningful constraint on the rulemaking authority of the Supreme 
Court? Second, if so, what is the nature of that constraint? I will address these 
questions in reverse order. 
1. "Substantive Right" 
As noted at the outset of this Article and elaborated below,81 the REA's 
admonition against abridging substantive rights derives from constitutional 
limitations on Congress's delegation authority:82 Congress may not delegate its 
legislative powers, 83 particularly the power to create prospective rules of substantive 
law untethered from adjudication.84 I am in accord with Justice Thomas in seeing 
81 . See infra Subpart I.B.2. 
82. See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1025 ("The historical evidence compels the view 
that the limitations imposed by the famous first two sentences of the Act . . .  were intended to 
allocate power between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress and thus to circumscribe 
the delegation oflegislative power . . . .  "). 
83. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72 ("[W]e long have insisted that 'the integrity and 
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution' mandate that Congress 
generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch." ( quoting Marshall Field & Co. 
v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892))). 
84. The original Supreme Court Advisory Committee that crafted the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure appeared to recognize this constitutional limitation as guiding their understanding of 
the limits that the REA imposed. Its chair, Attorney General William D. Mitchell, noted that 
"constitutional limitations would have prevented the Congress, even if it had tried, from 
delegating to the courts power to make rules of substantive law." Remarks of Hon. William D. 
Mitchell (July 21,  1938), in AM. BARAss'N,RULF.SOF CML PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS 
OF THE UNITED STATES WITH NOTES As PREPARED UNDER THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO 182 (William W. Dawson 
ed., 1938). 
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this limitation as meaning that the prescription of general rules governing private 
conduct at the federal level is a legislative act. 85 Therefore, a "  substantive right" under 
the REA concerns what I may and may not do to others and what I can expect others 
not to do to me.86 More specifically, a substantive right is an entitlement that arises 
out of the duties, obligations, and privileges we have with respect to one another that 
render us physically and mentally secure and protect our lives, liberty, and 
property. 87 
Substantive rights are relational, being a necessary concomitant of humans in 
society with one another.88 Examples abound. I have a right not to experience 
negligent, reckless, or wanton conduct from others as I go about my daily life.89 I 
85. See Dep't of Transp. v. Ass'n of Am. RR, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1245 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in 
the judgment) ("[T]he core of the legislative power that the Framers sought to protect from 
consolidation with the executive is the power to make 'law' in the Blackstonian sense of generally 
applicable rules of private conduct."); see a/so WILLIAM BIACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGIAND 38 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1765) (describing the general law as a "rule of 
action, which is prescribed by some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey"); Stephen 
B. Burbank, Response, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and 
"Procedure "  in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1019-20 (1989) [hereinafter 
Burbank, Hold the Corks] ("I believe that, under theoriginalEnabling Act, the restrictions on court 
rulemaking should have been read to effect the purpose of allocating federal lawmaking power of 
the legislative type . . . . I also believe that prospective federal lawmaking that necessarily and 
obviously involves policy choices with a predictable and identifiable impact on rights claimed 
under substantive law is properly the province of Congress."). 
86. Paul Carrington offered a more political definition of how one may know whether a substantive 
right is implicated by a procedural rule: "Such a rule does not affect a substantive right, within the 
meaning of the second sentence of the Act, if its application is sufficiently broad to evoke no 
organized political attention of a group oflitigants or prospective litigants who (reasonably) claim 
to be specially and adversely affected by the rule." Carrington, supra note 5, at 308. I disagree that 
this supplies the right lodestar; because many reforms to procedural rules inspire political 
attention and opposition, such a reaction cannot reliably indicate whether a rule offends 
substantive rights. 
87. In articulating this definition of substantive rights, I focus more on their nature and effect than on 
the motivation underlying them, which is the focus of Professor Ely. See Ely, supra note 5, at 725-
26 ("The most helpful way, it seems to me, of defining a substantive rule-or more particularly a 
substantive right, which is what the Act refers to-is as a right granted for one or more 
nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or 
efficiency of the litigation process."). I prefer not to define substantive rights merely in opposition 
to procedural rights, but rather to supply them with their own descriptive character. Nonetheless, 
I, like Ely, embrace a notion of substantive rights not limited to those that "affect people's conduct 
at the stage of primary private activity," but that extends also to those that relate to "the fostering 
and protection of certain states of mind." Id. at 725-26 ( quoting H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE 
FEDERALCOlJRT AND THEFEDERAL SYSTEM678 (1953)). 
88. See IMMANUELKANT,GROUNDINGFOR THEMETAFHYSICSOFMORALS 114 (John Ladd ed. &trans., 
2d ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1996) (concluding that people should participate in a legal system "if 
they ever could (even involuntarily) come into a relationship with one another that involves 
mutual rights"). 
89. See, e.g., Iglehart v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 60 P.3d 497,502 (Okla. 2002) ("Generally a 'defendant 
owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct with respect to 
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have a right to have a valid contract enforced.90 I have a right to exclusive enjoyment 
of property deeded in my name.91 I have a right to use products that are not 
unreasonably dangerous. 92 I have a right to be warned of dangerous conditions that 
a proprietor knows or should know about.93 I have a right not to be physically 
restrained against my will by one lacking lawful authority.94 
Subsumed within these rights are a bundle of issues that determine their scope 
and extent. For example, one's entitlement to relief based on the negligent conduct 
of another depends on a range of factors. When did the alleged negligent 
conduct occur?95 Did the alleged negligent conduct cause any harm to the 
purported victim?96 To what extent did the victim's own negligence contribute to 
the injuries?97 Was the victim well aware of the risk presented by negligent conduct 
but subjected themselves to it nonetheless?98 Was the victim on the property as an 
all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous."' (quoting Wofford v. E. State Hosp., 
795 P.2d 516,519 (1990))). 
90. See, e.g., Advantage Physical Therapy, Inc. v. Cruse, 165 S.W.3d 21, 24 (Tex. App. 2005) ("The 
elements of . . .  an enforceable contract are: (1) an offer; (2) an acceptance in strict compliance with 
terms of offer; (3) a meeting of the minds; (4) a communication that each party consented to the 
terms of the contract; (5) execution and delivery of the contract with an intent it become mutual 
and binding on both parties; and ( [ 6]) consideration."). 
91. See, e.g., Charleston Joint Venture v. McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544, 549 (S.C. 1992) ("One in 
peaceable possession may maintain an action for trespass against another who interferes with his 
quiet and exclusive enjoyment of the property."). 
92. See, e.g., Town ofWestport v. Monsanto Co., 877 F.3d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 2017) ("In order to establish 
a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the product was 'defective and unreasonably dangerous' for the 'ordinary 
purposes' for which it was 'fit,' at the time that it left the supplier's hands." (quoting Evans v. 
Lorillard Tobacco Co., 990 N.E.2d 997, 1010 (Mass. 2013))). 
93. See, e.g.,Armstrong v.BestBuy Co., 788 N.E.2d 1088, 1089 (Ohio2003) ("A shopkeeperordinarily 
owes its business invitees a duty of ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe 
condition and has the duty to warn its invitees of latent or hidden dangers."). 
94. See, e.g., Escambia Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Bragg, 680 So. 2d 571,572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("The tort 
offalse imprisonment or false arrest is defined as 'the unlawful restraint of a person against his will, 
the gist of which action is the unlawful detention of the plaintiff and the deprivation ofhis liberty."' 
(quoting Johnson v. Weiner, 19 So.2d 699, 700 (1944))) . 
95. See, e.g., Swanson v. Howard Univ., 249 F. Supp. 3d 259,263 (D.D.C. 2017) ("Because plaintiffs 
alleged injury occurred over fourteen years ago, her negligence claim is barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations."); see also Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868) 
("[Statutes of limitations] are enacted to restrict the period within which the right, otherwise 
unlimited, might be asserted."). 
96. See, e.g., Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Mgmt., 542 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) 
(requiring, to prove a cause of action for negligence in Illinois, that a plaintiff must prove facts that 
establish an injury proximately resulting from a breach of an owed duty). 
97. See, e.g., Dennis v. Jones, 928 A.2d 672, 676 (D.C. 2007) (Contributory negligence "is an 
affirmative defense in negligence cases and may operate as a complete bar to liability."). 
98. Lascheid v. City of Kennewick, 154 P.3d 307, 310 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) ("[A] ssumption of risk is 
a complete bar to recovery."). 
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authorized invitee/licensee or was the victim trespassing?99 Each of these 
considerations, and more, feed into the definition of the right. '0° For example, the 
right to compensation for the negligent conduct of another may be one that is two 
years in duration and only available to actually harmed invitees upon property with 
no knowledge of any dangerous conditions who engage in no conduct that 
contributes to their own harm. When the requisite conditions obtain, the victim 
may have a right of action that is itself treated as a substantive right.101 
We also have substantive rights respecting our relationship with governments. I 
have a right to vote if I am 18 years of age or older.102 I have a right to bear arms.103 I 
have a right to be secure from prosecution by the government for certain actions I take 
as a governmental official, 104 or as a member of Congress.105 Certain children with 
disabilities have a right to a "free appropriate public education.''106 The list could go 
on.107 
99. Salaman v. City of Waterbury, 717 A.2d 161, 164 (Conn. 1998) ("The status of an entrant on 
another's land, be it trespasser, licensee or invitee, determines the duty that is owed to the entrant 
while he or she is on a landowner's property."). 
100. I take what I have described here-the notion that there are peripheral rules that are essential to 
defining the scope and extent of a substantive right and that should themselves be viewed as 
components of the substantive right-to be part of what Justice Stevens was getting at in his 
concurrence in Shady Grove when he wrote, "A federal rule, therefore, cannot govern a particular 
case in which the rule would displace a state law that is procedural in the ordinary use of the term 
but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the scope of the state­
created right." Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,423 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
101. See, e.g., Bronner v. Exch. State Bank, 455 N.W.2d 289, 290 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) ("Causes of 
action, including rights of action arising from contracts, constitute property rights."). 
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
103. U.S. CONST. amend. IL 
104. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1864 (2014) (noting that the qualified immunity doctrine 
"immunizes government officials from damages suits unless their conduct has violated a clearly 
established right"). 
105. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 6, cl. 1 (Speech or Debate Clause); Rangel v. Boehner, 785 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) ("Although criminal liability was the 'chief fear' of our forebears, the Speech or Debate 
Clause also provides absolute immunity from civil suit." ( quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 
U.S.169, 182 (1966))). 
1 06. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-82 (2012 ); Bd. ofEd. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 203-04 (1982) (interpreting predecessor version of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act as conferring a right to an appropriate public education on disabled children). 
107. What about rights like the right to a jury in certain criminal and civil legal cases-are those 
substantive rights? In the sense described above, these rights pertain to procedure, 
because they concern the manner in which the government may deprive us of our substantive 
rights. However, their constitutional basis protects them from interference nevertheless-not 
because they are substantive rights under the REA, but because they are constitutional 
entitlements. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VIL 
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2. A Separate Constraint? 
This understanding of substantive rights aids mightily in determining whether 
the "shall not abridge" language of the REA provides any constraint beyond the 
admonition that rules promulgated thereunder be rules of procedure. The 
governmental act of prospectively'08 conferring and defining the bundle of 
obligations and privileges that yield the entitlements described above is a legislative 
function ( at least at the federal level) because such rights reflect basic policy decisions 
that shape our society.109 Further, once conferred, legal ( or further legislative) 
processes must be employed to deprive us of these rights."0 The "shall not abridge" 
provision of the REA speaks to each of these concerns. It ensures that the Supreme 
Court does not (1) engage in the legislative act of creating or defining substantive 
rights prospectively or (2) deprive us of those rights under the guise of prescribing 
procedural rules.1 1 1  The admonition not to abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive 
rights is thus fundamentally designed to police the separation of powers, confining 
the Court-in its rulemaking capacity-to its proper sphere.1 12  Granting that the "shall 
not abridge" language serves this function, is it doing anything that the REA' s limitation 
of the Court to prescribing "rules of practice and procedure" does not do?m It is true 
108. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith,496 U.S.167,201 (1990) (Scalia, J.,concurring) ("[P]rospective 
decisionmaking is incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to 
prescribe what it shall be."). 
109. See Mistretta v. United States,488 U.S. 361,415 (1989) (Scalia,J.,dissenting) ("Except ina few areas 
constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch, the basic policy decisions governing society 
are to be made by the Legislature.");see also United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 695 (4th Cir. 
1982)_ ("[!]he prescription of general rules of substantive law lies at the heart of the legislative function. ). 
110. E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. IV (requiring a search warrant), V (requiring due process with respect 
to federal governmental deprivations), XIV (requiring due process with respect to non-federal 
governmental deprivations). 
111. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965) ("[N]either Congress nor the federal courts can, 
under the guise of formulating rules of decision for federal courts, fashion rules which are not 
supported by a grant of federal authority contained in Article I or some other section of the 
Constitution; in such areas state law must govern because there can be no other law."); cf Guar. 
Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945) ("In giving federal courts 'cognizance' of equity suits in 
cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congress never gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim, the 
power to deny substantive rights created by State law orto create substantive rights denied by State 
law."). 
11 2. See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1113 ("The purpose of the procedure/substance 
is . . .  to allocate policy choices-to determine which federal lawmaking body, the Court or 
Congress, shall decide whether there will be federally enforceable rights regarding the matter in 
question and the content of those rights."). 
113. The chair of the advisory committee that drafted the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
answered this question in the negative: 
This statute provides that the rules shall relate to pleading practice and procedure, 
and that they shall not affect substantive rights of the litigant. That last phrase is 
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that both provisions address separation of powers concerns-but they do so in 
different and equally important ways. 
There are two aspects of legislative power reflected in the REA. The first aspect 
is the power to prescribe prospective, supervisory rules of procedure operative in the 
inferior federal courts. The REA is necessary because the Constitution does not 
confer on the Supreme Court supervisory authority over the inferior federal 
courts1 14 beyond its appellate jurisdiction.1 15 Neither is such supervisory authority 
through prospective regulation an inherently judicial power, as it is not a necessary 
concomitant of the Supreme Court deciding the cases before it.1 16 Rather, 
determining the practice before the inferior federal courts is something each 
respective inferior court could do individually as a prerequisite to adjudication, 1 17 or 
probably surplusage. If it had said "pleading practice and procedure " and stopped 
there, that would have excluded substantive rights, and furthermore constitutional 
limitations would have prevented the Congress, even ifit had tried, from delegating 
to the courts power to make rules of substantive law. 
Mitchell, supra note 84, at 182. Below, I will argue that Mitchell was mistaken to refer to the latter 
clause as surplusage, as it embodied and solidified the very constitutional constraints that he 
acknowledged in the same breath. 
114. Mistretta,488 U.S. at 389 ("[T]hejudicial powerofthe United States is limited by express provision 
of Article III to 'Cases' and 'Controversies."'). 
115. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
116. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 392 ('To be sure, all rulemaking is nonjudicial in the sense that rules 
impose standards of general application divorced from the individual fact situation which 
ordinarily forms the predicate for judicial action."); see also supra text accompanying note 25 
(discussing this point). But see John H. Wigmore, EditorialNote,AllLegislativeRules for Judiciary 
Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 Ill. L. REv. 276 (1928) (arguing that promulgating rules 
for the judiciary is a judicial function). For more than a century prior to the enactment of the REA, 
the Supreme Court promulgated supervisory equity rules for the federal courts, but this too was 
done pursuant to congressional authorization, not the Supreme Court's inherent authority. See 
Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 ("[T]he forms of writs, executions and other 
process . . .  shall be the same as are now used in the said courts . . .  in those of equity and in those 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, according to the principles, rules and usages which belong 
to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively . . .  subject however . . .  to such 
regulations as the supreme court of the United States shall think proper from time to time by rule 
to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same."). 
117. See Kelleher, supra note 3, at 66 ("The Court's decisions are fairly read as recognizing only an 
inherent authority in the judicial branch to control procedure in the context of adjudicating 
particular cases."); see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) ("It has long been 
understood that ' [ c ]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the 
nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are 
necessary to the exercise of all others."' (quoting United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 32, 34 (1812))). Professor Burbank has pointed out that Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 
Wall.) 123 ( 1865)-which stated, "Circuit courts, as well as all other Federal courts, have authority 
to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, 
provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States," id. at 128-was not 
suggesting an inherent authority of federal courts to engage in rulemaking, because the Court in 
that passage quotes (without attribution) the language of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. 
Judiciary Actof l 789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83; Burbank, Sanctions, supra note 13, at 1004-05 n.30. 
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that Congress can do pursuant to its power to "make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . .  all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof"' 18 
To the extent that the Court's REA rulemaking power is both prospective and 
supervisory, it is-at the federal level at least-legislative. It is this very rulemaking 
power that Congress has conferred on the Supreme Court in the first sentence of the 
REA. The purpose of the REA' s first provision, then, is to specify what it is that is 
being conferred: the ability to prescribe rules of procedure and rules of evidence. The 
prescription of rules of the other kinds described above (rules of decision, 
jurisdictional rules, and rules of redress) are ultra vires and beyond the delegation. 
The second sentence of the REA concerns the second aspect of legislative power 
already described: the articulation and alteration of substantive rights through 
prospective regulation. That enterprise is a legislative prerogative Congress has 
retained for itself, notwithstanding its grant of authority to make procedural rules. 
In sum, the REA' s statement regarding "rules of practice and procedure and rules of 
evidence" is the authorization that the Court requires to exercise this power and the 
articulation of the genre of rules that the Court may prescribe; the REA's "shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify" language is a qualification on the authorization, 
constraining the Court to a subfield of procedural and evidentiary rules that avoid 
the alteration of substantive rights (as would, for example, a procedural rule 
indicating that liability would be determined through a trial by ordeal). "9 
The relationship between the two wings of the REA is thus complementary: 
Regulations in the procedural sphere are permitted, but not those that revise or 
expand substantive rights. The refinements offered above with respect to both of 
these admonitions can not only guide the Supreme Court (and subordinate 
rulemaking committees) in the rulemaking enterprise, but also supply the Court 
with the required intelligible principle needed to render the congressional delegation 
in the REA constitutionally sound.120 The REA' s grant of authority is a permitted 
118. U.S. CONST. art. I ,§ 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 
(1965) ("For the constitutional provision for a federal court system ( augmented by the Necessary 
and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice and 
pleading in those courts."); Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632,656 (1835) ("[T]hatthe power 
to ordain and establish [federal courts], carries with it the power to prescribe and regulate the 
modes of proceeding in such courts, admits of . . .  little doubt."). 
119. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) ("Because a state may dispense with a 
jury trial, it does not follow that it may substitute trial by ordeal. The rack and torture chamber 
may not be substituted for the witness stand."). 
120. The Court has held that Congress may not delegate its legislative authority and has indicated that 
delegations that are constrained by an "intelligible principle " do not run afoul of this prohibition. 
See J.W.Hampton,Jr., &Co. v. United States,276 U.S. 394,409 (1928) ("If Congress shalllaydown 
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delegation of legislative power because the REA' s twin admonitions delineate 
Congress's policy in this sphere-that there be "general rules" governing the 
processing of claims through the inferior courts created by Congress (and set the 
boundaries of the delegation), and that the rules may bear only on procedure or 
evidence and may not alter substantive rights.121 Further, as the Supreme Court has 
indicated, "Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatoryfunctions 
that do not trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate 
to the central mission of the Judiciary."122 Confining the Supreme Court to "rules of 
practice and procedure" while steering it away from regulation that alters 
substantive rights respects the Court's judicial role and facilitates rather than 
frustrates its judicial prerogatives. 
If the "shall not abridge" portion of the REA is its own constraint on Supreme 
Court rulemaking, how is it operationalized? As an initial matter, it is worth 
disposing of the easy case where a promulgated rule fails the "rule of procedure" ( or 
"rule of evidence") test outlined above: If it failed because it was a rule of decision or 
redress, the rule would of necessity abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights, 
resulting in no need to engage in a separate abridgement analysis. It is less clear 
whether a jurisdictional rule would necessarily abridge, enlarge or modify 
substantive rights. Opening up federal courts ( or closing them) to a particular claim 
ultimately does not alter substantive rights but concerns whether those courts will be 
fora in which transgressions of substantive rights can be vindicated.123 Nevertheless, 
because jurisdictional rules are not rules of procedure ( or evidence), they would be 
invalid under the REA notwithstanding their failure to alter substantive rights.124 
by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates 
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."). 
121. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 ("[T]his Court has deemed it 'constitutionally sufficient if 
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the 
boundaries of this delegated authority."' ( quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 
(1946))). 
122. Id. at 388. 
123. See, e.g., Great Am. Fed. Sav. &Loan Ass'n v. Novotny,442 U.S. 366,372 (1979) ("Section 1985(3) 
provides no substantive rights itself; it merely provides a remedy for violation of the rights it 
designates."); Pac. S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130,134 (1928) ("By section 33 of the Merchant 
Marine Act, as heretofore construed, the prior maritime law of the United States was modified by 
giving to seamen injured through negligence the rights given to railway employees by the 
Employers['] Liability Act of 1908 and its amendments and permitting these new substantive 
rights to be asserted and enforced in actions in personam against the employers in federal or state 
courts administering common-law remedies." (footnotes omitted)). 
124. Take note here: A jurisdictional rule, such as one that empowered federal courts to hear diversity 
cases, would not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," but it would not be a rule of 
procedure and thus would be beyond the congressional authorization. Thus, here we can see an 
example of the independent functions that the two wings of the REA perform. 
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If, on the other hand, the rule at hand concerns "procedure" ( that is, an internal 
case-processing rule), then one must confront whether the rule abridges, enlarges, or 
modifies substantive rights. There are two ways in which prohibited alterations 
could occur. First, the rule in question could alter substantive rights by creating new 
ones, in which case the rule would be invalid as long as the newly created rights were 
substantive, as defined above.125 But it is hard to imagine how any rule that achieved 
such a feat could fairly be classed as a rule of "procedure." Second, a procedural rule 
could abridge, enlarge, or modify existing substantive rights. For example, a rule 
that provided that a plaintiffs claim was to be decided by the toss of a coin 
undoubtedly would be a procedural rule, for it would prescribe the method of 
adjudication. However, a coin toss would not permit application of the relevant 
rules of decision, meaning that notwithstanding a state of facts that might entitle a 
plaintiff to relief, an adverse outcome on the coin toss would result in a finding that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to relief, depriving them of whatever substantive right was 
at issue in the case (for example, a right to have a contract breach compensated). 
Further, this coin toss would be a clear violation of due process for any coin-toss loser 
who would have prevailed on the merits: A losing plaintiff would be robbed of relief 
they were entitled to, while a losing defendant would be robbed of whatever money 
they were ordered to hand over as compensation, each because of a pure game of 
chance. 
The determination of whether a rule abridges, enlarges, or modifies substantive 
rights cannot be made without taking state-and federal126-substantive rights into 
account.127 As a practical matter, litigants will offer ( as they have in the past) candidate 
substantive rights that they believe are impinged upon by a given Federal Rule, 
eliminating the need for courts to engage in a broad-based canvassing of the entire 
landscape of substantive rights. Rulemaking bodies, however, will have to think 
more broadly and creatively about whether a proposed rule or amendment alters 
125. See supra Subpart I.B.l .  
126. The REA prohibits alteration of "any" substantive right, leaving no question that the prohibition 
applies both to state and federal substantive rights. See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, 
at 1109-10 ("[T]he Federal Rules contemplated by the Act were to apply in all civil actions tried in 
federal court, including those in which federal law furnished the rule of decision."). 
127. Justice Scalia, in his plurality opinion in Shady Grove, rejected the idea that courts would consult 
state law to determine its substantive character as a component of the Rules Enabling Act analysis. 
See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,409 (2015) ( opinion of 
Scalia, J.) ("[T]he substantive nature of New York's law, or its substantive purpose, makes no 
difference. A Federal Rule of Procedure is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others­
or valid in some cases and invalid in others-depending upon whether its effect is to frustrate a 
state substantive law ( or a state procedural law enacted for substantive purposes)."). I disagree, as 
I note in the main text. 
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some existing substantive right, perhaps inviting input on the question during the 
public comment phase of the rulemaking process. 
3. The View From the Supreme Court 
As noted at the outset of this Article, the Supreme Court has not been terribly 
clear on its views respecting the limitations imposed by the REA. Further, Justice 
Scalia's indication in Shady Grove that all that matters is that a rule must "really 
regulate procedure" without separate consideration of the alteration of substantive 
rights128 is disconcerting. However, Justice Scalia' s views can be fairly discounted on 
this point (for reasons I elaborate below), and other Supreme Court precedent on the 
topic supports a more robust view of the second wing of the REA in the validity 
analysis. 
In his plurality opinion in Shady Grove, Justice Scalia stated the REA inquiry as 
follows: 
In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized this Court to promulgate 
rules of procedure subject to its review, but with the limitation that those 
rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 
We have long held that this limitation means that the Rule must "really 
regulat[ e] procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties 
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and 
redress for disregard or infraction of them." The test is not whether the 
rule affects a litigant's substantive rights; most procedural rules do. What 
matters is what the rule itself regulates: If it governs only "the manner and 
the means" by which the litigants' rights are "enforced," it is valid; if it 
alters "the rules of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] 
rights," it is not.129 
Justice Scalia is correct when he says that "if it alters the rules of decision by which the 
court will adjudicate those rights," then the rule would be invalid. However, Justice 
Scalia was wrong when he discarded the "shall not abridge" language of the REA 
("The test is not whether the rule affects a litigant's substantive rights") and 
pronounced the fallacy that if a rule is procedural ("governs only 'the manner and the 
means"'), "it is valid." As the coin-toss rule example provided above demonstrates, 
1 28. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 410 ( opinion of Scalia, J.) ("We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed 
repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it regulates 
procedure."); id. at 407. 
1 29. Id. at 406-07 (citations omitted) (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 ,  14 (1941); Miss. 
Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946)). 
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a rule can be procedural-pertaining to the judicial process-but also alter 
substantive rights. 
Justice Scalia embraced what I call the unitary view of the REA based on his 
belief that it was mandated by Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 130 which, in his view, 
indicated that the sole test of the validity of a Federal Rule is whether it is 
procedural. 131 However, in urging this understanding of Sibbach and of the Court's 
approach to the REA, Justice Scalia-as he acknowledged-was yielding to stare 
decisis more than engaging in a faithful construction of the text of the REA. 
Regarding the text, Justice Scalia conceded that the REA could be read to distinguish 
between the "procedural" and "abridge, enlarge or modify" inquiries: 
[ Sibbach' s] approach, the concurrence insists, gives short shrift to the 
statutory text forbidding the Federal Rules from "abridg[ing], 
enlarge [ ing], or modify[ ing] any substantive right." There is something to 
that . . . .  Sibbach's exclusive focus on the challenged Federal Rule . . .  is 
hard to square with § 2072(b J's terms.132 
However, Justice Scalia went on to say, "Setting aside any precedent requires a 
'special justification' beyond a bare belief that it was wrong."133 
Notwithstanding his concession regarding the language of the REA-what 
might be felt to be a stunning move by a textualist134-Justice Scalia shunned the 
notion of independently applying the "abridge, enlarge or modify" portion of the 
REA because of its potential complexity and undesirable implications: 
But it is hard to understand how it can be determined whether a Federal 
Rule "abridges" or "modifies" substantive rights without knowing what 
state-created rights would obtain if the Federal Rule did not exist. Sibbach' s 
exclusive focus on the challenged Federal Rule [was] driven by the very real 
concern that Federal Rules which vary from State to State would be 
chaos . . . .  
1 30. 312 U.S. 1 (1941); Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 411 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("This analysis [considering 
the substantive nature of the conflicting state legal rule] squarely conflicts with Sibbach, which 
established the rule we apply."). 
1 3 1 .  Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at410 (opinion of Scalia, J.) ("We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed 
repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal Rule depends entirely upon whether it regulates 
procedure."). 
1 32. Id. at 412-13 ( opinion of Scalia, J.) ( emphasis added) ( citations omitted). 
1 33. Id. at 413 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 
(1989)). 
1 34. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL CrnJRTS AND THE LAW 22 (1997) 
("The text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed."); Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast 
Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) (Scalia, J.) ("Statutory construction must begin 
with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that 
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose." ( quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & 
Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985))). 
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Instead of a single hard question of whether a Federal Rule regulates 
substance or procedure, that approach will present hundreds of hard 
questions, forcing federal courts to assess the substantive or procedural 
character of countless state rules that may conflict with a single Federal 
Rule. And it still does not sidestep the problem it seeks to avoid. At the 
end of the day, one must come face to face with the decision whether or 
not the state policy (with which a putatively procedural state rule may be 
"bound up") pertains to a "substantive right or remedy" -that is, whether 
it is substance or procedure. The more one explores the alternatives to 
Sibbach' s rule, the more its wisdom becomes apparent.135 
683 
These fears-which only two other Justices shared136-were unwarranted. In the 
context of a challenge to an existing rule, the burden is likely to rest with the party 
asserting that a particular Federal Rule transgresses the "abridge, enlarge or modify" 
portion of the REA to come forward with the purported substantive right that is 
altered by the applicable Federal Rule. In the context of evaluating the validity of a 
proposed rule, the rulemaking committees would be advised to give due 
consideration for any apparent conflicts with substantive rights, across states, and 
use their judgment to reach a plausible conclusion that substantive rights will not be 
affected by the rule; they would leave it to litigants to argue the abridgment of rights 
in a given case. 
In light of the above, Justice Scalia's interpretation of the REA in Shady Grove 
should not lead us to embrace the if-procedural-then-valid approach. Moreover, 
Supreme Court precedent available to Justice Scalia and propounded since Shady 
Grove makes clear that the Court has embraced an understanding of the REA that 
gives its "abridge, enlarge or modify" language independent weight apart from the 
directive to confine rules to the procedural realm. 
In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,137 for example, the Court quoted 
the REA's prohibition against abridging, enlarging or modifying any substantive 
rights and wrote at some length about how the rule before it-Rule 4(f)-did not run 
afoul of that particular proscription: 
Undoubtedly most alterations of the rules of practice and procedure may 
and often do affect the rights of litigants. Congress' prohibition of any 
alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to 
such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed 
new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants who, agreeably to rules 
of practice and procedure, have been brought before a court authorized 
1 35. Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 412-13, 415 (footnotes omitted). 
1 36. Only Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined this part ofJustice Scalia's opinion. 
1 37. 326 U.S. 438 (1946). 
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to determine their rights. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 11-14. The 
fact that the application of Rule 4(f) will operate to subject petitioner's 
rights to adjudication by the district court for northern Mississippi will 
undoubtedly affect those rights. But it does not operate to abridge, enlarge 
or modify the rules of decision by which that court will adjudicate its 
rights.138 
In its next breath, the Court wrote: "It relates merely to 'the manner and the means 
by which a right to recover . . .  is enforced.' In this sense the rule is a rule of procedure 
and not of substantive right, and is not subject to the prohibition of the Enabling 
Act."139 
Note two things here. First, the Court discussed whether the rule in question 
abridged, enlarged or modified substantive rights, and concluded that Rule 4(f) did 
not alter "the rules of decision by which that court will adjudicate its rights." Then it 
articulated the York understanding of a procedural rule to declare that Rule 4(f) is 
indeed "a rule of procedure and not of a substantive right." Granted, these analyses 
tightly interrelate the notion of the alteration of substantive rights with the 
characterization of a rule as a rule of decision or a rule of procedure. But the Court 
did not dispense with the substantive rights alteration analysis entirely in favor of an 
untethered and self-absorbed assessment of whether a rule was procedural. 
It is Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Woods,140 however, that most strongly 
confirms the distinctiveness of the "shall not abridge" portion of the REA. The Court 
first described the constitutional analysis for promulgated rules and then 
distinguished that from the constraints imposed by the REA: 
Rules regulating matters indisputably procedural are a pnon 
constitutional. Rules regulating matters "which, though falling within the 
uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable 
of classification as either," also satisfy this constitutional standard. The 
Rules Enabling Act, however, contains an additional requirement. The 
Federal Rule must not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right . . . .  "141 
If it were correct that the REA test boils down to simply whether the rule in question 
is procedural-as Justice Scalia asserted in Shady Grove142-then there would be no 
1 38. Id. at445-46. 
1 39. Id. at446 (quoting Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326U.S. 99, 109 (1945)). 
1 40. 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
1 4 1 .  Id. at 5 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965); 28 U.S.C. §2072 (1986)). 
1 42. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 410 ( opinion of Scalia, J.) 
("We have held since Sibbach, and reaffirmed repeatedly, that the validity of a Federal Rule 
depends entirely upon whether it regulates procedure."). 
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distinction between the REA analysis and the constitutional analysis,143 nor would 
the Court's above-quoted statement from Woods make any sense. In other words, 
one would have to conclude that "the Act delegate [s] authority coextensive with 
Congress's constitutional rulemaking authority under Article III and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause." 144 
More recently, the Court has alluded to the REA' s "abridge, enlarge or modify" 
language on its own as a relevant constraint on promulgated rules, without 
suggesting that satisfying that admonition may be achieved simply by being able to 
characterize such rules as "procedural." This has occurred several times in the 
context of interpreting and applying Rule 23. In Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 145 
the Court indicated that to permit Rule 23 to exclude evidence that would be relevant 
and probative of a plaintiffs individual claim, merely because the claim is brought 
on behalf of a class, "would ignore the Rules Enabling Act's pellucid instruction that 
use of the class device cannot 'abridge . . .  any substantive right."'146 In Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes147 the Court (per Justice Scalia) similarly declined to permit Rule 
23 to be employed to deprive a defendant of its right to litigate defenses applicable 
only to individual claims, "[b] ecause the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting 
Rule 23 to 'abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."'148 And before Shady 
Grove, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,149 the Court declined to interpret Rule 23 as 
liquidating individual tort claims because "no reading of the Rule can ignore the 
Act's mandate that 'rules of procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right."'"150 
143. Professor Burbank seemed to trace this error to Hanna when he wrote, "the [Hanna] Court did 
fail to make clear how the Enabling Act's restrictions are functionally different from those 
imposed on Congress by the Constitution." Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 85, at 1017. 
144. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE §4509 (3d ed. 2016) (arguing ultimately that this understanding of the REA is 
improper). 
145. 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016). 
146. Id. at 1046. 
14 7. 564 U.S. 338 (2011 ). 
148. Id. at 367. The Court in Tyson Foods described this decision in the following terms: "The Court 
[in Wal-Mart] held that this 'Trial By Formula' was contrary to the Rules Enabling Act because it 
'enlarge[d]' the class members' 'substantive right[s]' and deprived defendants of their right to 
litigate statutory defenses to individual claims." Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048 (quoting Wal­
Mart, 564 U.S. at 367). 
149. 527 U.S. 815 (1999). 
150. Id. at 845 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,613 (l997)); see alsoAmchem 
Prods., 521 U.S. at 613 ("Rule 23's requirements must be interpreted in keeping with Article III 
constraints, and with the Rules Enabling Act, which instructs that rules of procedure 'shall not 
abridge,enlarge or modifyany substantive right."' (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2072(b) (2012)). 
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Outside of the Rule 23 context, in Semtekinternational, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin 
Corp., 151 when asked to read Rule 41 (b) as determining the preclusive effect of federal 
court judgments, the Court (under the pen of Justice Scalia) refused, partly because 
"such a rule would arguablyviolate the jurisdictional limitation of the Rules Enabling 
Act: that the Rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."'152 
The Semtek Court also noted-without resolving-the question of whether a 
federal diversity court's entry of a dismissal with prejudice under circumstances 
in which a state court would only dismiss without prejudice "abridges a 
'substantive right' and thus exceeds the authorization of the Rules Enabling Act." 153 
Both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens acknowledged this perspective in their 
Shady Grove opinions.154 Justice Stevens perhaps offered the most robust defense of the 
two-step approach when he wrote: 
Justice Scalia believes that the sole Enabling Act question is whether the 
federal rule "really regulates procedure," which means, apparently, 
whether it regulates "the manner and the means by which the litigants' 
rights are enforced." I respectfully disagree. This interpretation of the 
Enabling Act is consonant with the Act's first limitation to "general rules 
of practice and procedure," § 2072( a). But it ignores the second limitation 
that such rules also "not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," 
§ 2072(b) (emphasis added), and in so doing ignores the balance that 
Congress struck between uniform rules of federal procedure and respect 
for a State's construction of its own rights and remedies. It also ignores 
the separation-of-powers presumption and federalism presumption that 
counsel against judicially created rules displacing state substantive law.155 
This is a remarkable passage, as Justice Stevens soundly took Justice Scalia to school 
here. Beyond merely relying upon the clear language of the REA ( which undeniably 
is two-tiered in its structure) to note that there is both a "first limitation" and a 
"second limitation," Justice Stevens connected that structure to fundamental 
concerns relating to separation of powers and federalism. 
This separation -of-powers concern has already been discussed. 156 Congress­
not the Supreme Court-has the constitutional authority to regulate procedure, 
1 51 . 531 U.S.497 (2001 ). 
152. Id. at 503. 
153. Id. at 506 n.2. 
1 54. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,438 (2010) ( Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (" [T]he Rules Enabling Act, enacted in 1934, authorizes us to 'prescribe general rules 
of practice and procedure' for the federal courts, but with a crucial restriction: 'Such rules shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."'). 
155. Id. at 424-25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ( citations omitted). 
1 56. See supra text accompanying notes 108-118. 
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through prospective, supervisory rules that may simultaneously affect substantive 
matters.157 In contrast, the federal judiciary can be presumed to possess only 
whatever supervisory rulemaking authority that Congress expressly gives it. 
Reading the REA as a congressional delegation of the full scope of rule making power 
that Congress enjoys-notwithstanding express language suggesting to the 
contrary-disrespects the separation of powers that the Constitution envisions.158 
Congress should not be presumed to have given the full scope of its own procedural 
regulatory authority in the absence of express language making that clear-and 
certainly not in the face of language that cuts the other way. 
A unitary approach to the REA also conflicts with the solicitude for state 
substantive policies159 that the Court counseled in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 160 
A federal judiciary that can make laws altering substantive rights undermines the 
state lawmaking authority secured by our Constitution.161 Constitutional federalism 
requires that we presume the federal judiciary lacks the power to impinge upon state 
policies, notwithstanding that Congress has this power. Instead, Congress must 
157. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) ("For the constitutional provision for a federal court 
system (augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to 
make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in tum includes a power to 
regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and 
procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either."). 
158. See WRIGHT,MILLER&CooPER, supra note 144. They write: 
[T]he rulemaking authority of the federal courts generally is understood to extend 
only so far as Congress expressly permits or as is necessary to effectuate important 
federal policies as they have been defined by Congress. The mere fact, therefore, 
that Congress has the constitutional power to formulate substantive law in areas of 
federal concern does not in itself give the federal judiciary an equal power to fashion 
substantive rules, and certainly no such judicial power reasonably can be inferred 
from the delegation of authority to the Supreme Court to prescribe general rules of 
practice and procedure for the federal courts. 
See also Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 1106-12 (arguing that the REA was designed 
to limit the prospective rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court in service of separation-of­
powers concems). 
1 59. By featuring federalism concerns here I do not mean to suggest that the REA was crafted with an 
eye toward protecting federalism Indeed, as Professor Burbank has so ably demonstrated, the notion 
that the REA was designed with this purposeinmind appears to be demonstrably false. Id. at 1108-12. 
However, an incidental and valuable consequence of the REA is the solicitude it can engender for state 
substantive rights. It is appropriate to read the REA to accommodate state substantive prerogatives 
rather than to undercut them, absent any evidence that Congress desired a contrary result. 
160. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state."). 
161. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 47 4-75 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[Erie] recognized that 
the scheme ofour Constitution envisions an allocation of law-makingfunctions between state and 
federal legislative processes which is undercut if the federal judiciary can make substantive law 
affecting state affairs beyond the bounds of congressional legislative powers in this regard. Thus, 
in diversity cases Erie commands that it be the state law governing primary private activity which 
prevails." (footnote omitted)). 
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expressly authorize the federal courts to interfere with state substantive policies via 
procedural rulemaking.162 But in the REA we have the precise opposite-an express 
repudiation of any power in the federal courts to impinge on state ( and federal) 
substantive rights: Congress commanded that " [s]uch rules shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right." 163 To presume to the contrary that the 
Supreme Court's rulemaking authority is constrained only by the admonition that 
such rules be "procedural" is to defy this command and arrogate powers that our 
federalism does not allow the Court to exercise by implication or its own fiat. 
II. IMPLICATIONS 
What are the implications of reading the REA to require rules promulgated by 
the Supreme Court both (1) to be "rules of procedure" (or "rules of evidence") as 
opposed to rules of decision, jurisdiction, or redress, and (2) to "not abridge, enlarge 
or modify any substantive right"? As it turns out, some Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure run afoul of these congressional commands in ways that require revision. 
I discuss two problematic rules here.164 
162. See WRIGHT, MILLER &COOPER, supra note 144, at 293-94. They write: 
Id. 
When matters of state substantive law are at issue, principles of federalism-which 
command that substantial deference be given to the ways in which the states have seen 
fit to structure social relationships in areas of state competence-also are 
implicated. Thus, even though Congress may have constitutional power to 
override state substantive laws and policies when exercising its authorityto regulate 
the process and procedure of the federal courts, federalism concerns together with 
considerations related to the separation of powers militate against recognizing a 
similar power in the judiciary, at least not without explicit congressional 
authorization. 
163. See id. at 294. The authors argue: 
Id. 
Even if the Enabling Act did not include the "substantive rights" proviso, these 
considerations would dictate that judicial authority to prescribe procedural rules 
be exercised with a sensitive respect for the integrity of the structure of rights and 
responsibilities as defined both by Congress and the states within their respective 
areas of competence. The inclusion of the proviso in the Act, whatever its original 
meaning and intent, therefore, serves to emphasize and reinforce these institutional 
constraints upon the Supreme Court's rulemaking authority under it 
164. One of the rules I do not find problematic is Rule 35, the rule at issue in Sibbach. Neither a judge-made 
rule nor a codified federal rule could force a person to submit to a physical examination. But that 
is not what Rule 35 does. Rather, it indicates that if physical or mental condition is put in issue by 
a litigant, a prerequisite to adjudicating that issue is the litigant's submission to an independent 
physical examination on the request of the adversary(if good cause is shown). FED. R Civ. P. 35(a). 
Personal autonomy and security of one's person is not violated, because the litigant is making a 
choice; there is no seizure and forced examination against the litigant's will. Indeed, there are 
consequences associated with not submitting to such an exam, but those are limited to the 
litigation itself and bear directly on the adjudicatory process surrounding the determination of the 
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A. Rule 15(c)(l) 
The relation back rule found in Rule 15(c)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure raises a question of validity under the REA because it permits claims that 
are asserted after an applicable statute of limitations period165 has expired to go 
forward. Here is the language of Rule 15( c )( 1): 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. 
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a 
pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when: 
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations 
allows relation back; 
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of 
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out-or attempted 
to be set out-in the original pleading; or 
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the 
party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(l)(B) is 
satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for 
serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in 
by amendment: 
claim to which the physical or mental exam relates. A finding of contempt of court is expressly 
made unavailableforrefusing tosubmittoanexam underRule 35. FED.R C!v. P.37(b)(2)(A)(vii). 
The rule thus abridges no substantive rights. 
1 65. I will note here that statutes of repose-which are distinct from statutes of limitation-have been 
regarded by courts as not avoidable by application of Rule 15(c)'s relation back provisions. See, 
e.g., Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1 161, 1 165 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the Rules 
Enabling Act prohibited the application of Rule 15(c) to a claim that was barred by a statute of 
repose because it would expand a substantive right); Silvercreek Mgmt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 248 F. 
Supp. 3d 428, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) ("[T]he statute of repose creates a 'substantive right' for a 
putative defendant to be free from suit for particular conduct after a certain period of time, 
whether the suit is brought by a new party or by a party with a lawsuit already pending. Liability 
for suit under an entirely novel cause of action a full seven years after the expiration of the statute 
of repose amounts to a more than incidental impact on the parties' substantive rights and . . .  risks 
running afoul of the Rules Enabling Act." (citations omitted)); D & S Marine Transp., LLC. v. S & 
K Marine, LLC, No: 14-2048, 2015 WL 5838220, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2015) (concluding that 
"[p]ermitting relation back of a perempted [sic] claim under Rule 15(c) would expand a 
substantive right, which is prohibited by the Rules Enabling Act"); cf Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. 
IndyMac MBS, Inc., 721 F.3d 95, 109 (2d Cir. 2013) ("[T]he statute ofrepose in Section 13 [ of the 
Securities Act] creates a substantive right, extinguishing claims after a three-year period. 
Permitting a plaintiff to file a complaint or intervene after the repose period set forth in Section 13 
of the Securities Act has run would therefore necessarily enlarge or modify a substantive right and 
violate the Rules Enabling Act."). But see United States ex rel. Carterv. Halliburton Co., 315 F.RD. 
56, 64-65 (E.D. Va. 2016) (applying Rule 15(c)(l)(B) to circumvent a statute ofrepose). 
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(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be 
prejudiced in defending on the merits; and 
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have 
been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the 
proper party's identity.166 
This rule creates a legal fiction: New claims or claims against new parties 
asserted after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations period are treated 
as if they were filed prior to the expiration of that period. Specifically, the court pretends 
that they were filed at the time of the original pleading, 
167 which preswnably was itself 
filed within the statute of limitations period. The effect of this legal fiction is that any 
applicable statute oflimitations defense that would be valid under the circwnstances is 
nonetheless defeated.168 Is it proper under the REA for a Rule of Civil Procedure to 
work this effect?169 
166. FmR Civ.P.15(c)(l). 
167. See, e.g., Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709, 716 (Colo. 2009) (en bane) ("When an amended 
complaint satisfies the requirements for relation back, it is as though the amended complaint were 
filed on the date that the original complaint was filed."). 
168. See, e.g., Oliva v. NBTY, Inc., No. 11-80850, 2011 WL 13115434, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 2011) 
("[T]he Court holds that the relation back doctrine is applicable here to defeat the affirmative 
defense raised by Defendant . . . .  "). 
169. Professor Carrington analyzed this question in light ofhis functional approach to interpreting the 
REA, finding it to be valid under the Act. Carrington, supra note 5, at 310-13. Others have 
asked-but not thoroughly analyzed-this question, with some leaning towards a view that Rule 
15(c) crosses the REA line. See C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center 
for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU L. REV. 267,287 ("The drafters of the Federal Rules have already 
taken a step toward displacing state limitations periods in diversity actions by incorporating in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 'relation back' rules for amendments of complaints that may 
be more liberal than those of the states in which the federal court sits. The consistency of this aspect 
of Rule 15 with the Rules Enabling Act and the federalism rationale of Erie is not free from 
debate."); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil 
Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1555 (1987) ("A substantial question remains, even after 
Hanna, about the constitutionality of applying a federal rule so as to trench on deeply held state 
limitations policy."); Renee Reichart Johnson, Note, Civil Procedure-The Erie Doctrine and 
Relation Back of SupplementalPleadings Under Rule 15( c)-Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 16 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 621,640 (1980) ("If, however, Rule 15( c) is sufficiently broad to cover the precise 
issue in Davis [v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. 1980)], it is possible that Rule 15(c) 
violates the Rules Enabling Act."). Professor Mary Kay Kane concluded that a prior iteration of 
Rule 15( c) did not violate theREA, resting her conclusion on the fact that its effect on litigant rights 
was "minimal" and that it "in no way modifies the decisional rules by which the court will 
adjudicate the rights involved." Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Year: Erie Railroad 
Company v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 671, 689 (1988). As I 
endeavor to show, although Rule 15(c) is on its face a procedural rule, using it to toll applicable 
limitation periods is a substantive enterprise that only Congress-not the Supreme Court-can 
undertake through prospective regulation. 
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The relation back rule is housed within the rule concerning amendments to 
pleadings. Certainly, pleading is a matter of procedure170 and the rules governing 
when and under what circumstances pleadings may be amended are procedural as 
well, for both concern the manner in which claims are presented to the court for 
adjudication. Rule 15( c) takes things a step further and prescribes the date that will 
be ascribed to any claim, defense, or party introduced by the amendment. Time 
periods and the calculation thereof are important procedural topics for courts to 
address, as they ensure that claims will progress at some pace through the 
adjudicatory process. To the extent that Rule 15(c) merely designates a date of 
reference that a court will use to determine when a pleading has been presented to it, 
that designation seems-at least on its face-to concern the court's method of 
processing the claims contained in the pleadings. 
2. Does Rule 15(c) Abridge, Enlarge, or Modify Substantive Rights? 
The above analysis does not carry us very far, however. Although a rule 
designating the date of a pleading event for purposes of the judicial process concerns 
the method of adjudication in the abstract, what really matters are the purposes for 
which this designation is used and its attendant consequences. It is this latter set of 
considerations that reveal whether the rule impinges on or expands substantive 
rights. 
The principal effect of Rule 15 is to avoid the consequences of an applicable 
statute of limitations period.171 This avoidance occurs both when an amended pleading 
adds new claims against an existing defendant and when it names new defendants. 
170. See, e.g., Abbas v. Foreign Policy Grp., LLC, 783 F.3d 1328, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("[P]leading 
standards . . .  are procedural."). 
171. See, e.g., Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Rule 15(c) can 
ameliorate the running of the statute of limitations on a claim by making the amended claim relate 
back to the original, timely filed complaint."); ROBERT WYNF.Ss MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE 
TRIAL COURT INHISTORICAL PERSPECTNE 185 (1952) (noting that "[t]he principal object [of Rule 
15( c)(2)] is to obviate the harsh and scholastic doctrine, which in case of an amendment after the 
statute of limitations had run on the claim, treated deviation from the original statement in almost 
any material particular as the averment either of a new cause of action or of a cause of action for 
the first time, and thus as bringing the claim with the bar of the statute"). See also 6 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT,ARTHURR MILLER&MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE& PROCEDURE § 1471, at 587 
(3d ed. 2010) (stating that Rule 15' s "purpose is to provide maximum opportunity for each claim 
to be decided on its merits rather than on procedural technicalities"). Rule 15 does not have this 
effect when it isRule 15(c)(l)(A) that is being applied; that provision simply permits relation back 
when "the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back," and thus it is not the federal rule 
that enables avoidance of the effect of the limitations period but the applicable limitations statute 
itself Thus, Rule 15( c) (1) (A) presents no REA issues. 
692 66 UCLA L. REV. 654 (2019) 
Regarding new claims against existing defendants, Rule 15( c) ( 1) (B) permits relation 
back only of claims that arise out of the "conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
out-or attempted to be set out-in the original pleading." 172 Although newly 
asserted claims can avoid the effect of the expiration of an applicable limitations 
periods by operation of this rule, its requirement that such claims arise out of the 
same set of facts embodied in the original filing-and the fact that the correct 
defendant has already been named-assures that the substantive policy concerns 
addressed by statutes of limitation 173 are not undermined. One could thus argue that 
this makes any adverse effect of Rule 15(c)(l)(B) on substantive rights incidental, if 
not nonexistent. Further, the argument could continue, once a plaintiff initiates a 
claim based on a certain set of facts against the proper defendant, that defendant has 
been properly brought before the court to address that "constitutional case": 174 The 
addition of new legal theories of liability for the same set of facts would thus arguably 
not violate the defendant's right of repose.175 
However, strictly speaking, it is not really the office of a rule promulgated 
pursuant to the REA to use such considerations to justify the circumvention of an 
applicable, expired statute of limitations period. Permitting Rule 15( c) to be used to 
circumvent that deadline would still arguably impinge on the defendant's 
substantive rights by abrogating the immunity from liability that the applicable 
statute of limitations period would otherwise confer (liability immunity being the 
substantive right here). The rejoinder to this point may be, however, that mere 
172. FmR Civ.P. lS(c)(l)(B). 
173. Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594,608 (2018) (indicating that the primary purposes of 
limitations periods are "'preventing surprises' to defendants and 'barring a plaintiff who has slept 
on his rights."' (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974))); Wood v. 
Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 ( 1879) ( statutes of limitations "promote repose by giving security and 
stability to human affairs" and "stimulate to activity and punish negligence"); Suzette M. 
Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of Reparations Litigation, 74 
GEO. WASH.L.REv.68, 75 (2005) ("[A]t the heart ofthe law of limitations, isthe primacyof repose, 
or providing peace for the defendant."). 
174. Cf United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (defining a "constitutional 
case" as being when claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact"). 
175. See Barthel v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487,491 (5th Cir.1944). The court writes: 
Id. 
[T]he Rules validly fix the potential scope of a petition in a federal court which 
identifies a claim, and the relation of an amendment which amplifies and further 
explains the transaction out of which the claims arises, for these things are 
procedural. Limitation is suspended by the filing of a suit because the suit warns 
the defendant to collect and preserve his evidence in reference to it. When a suit is 
filed in a federal court under the Rules, the defendant knows that the whole 
transaction describedin itwill be fully sifted, by amendment if need be, and that the form 
of the action or the relief prayed or the law relied on will not be confined to their first 
statement. So long as the amendment is of the sort described in the above quoted Rule 
it is within the scope of the original suit and a part of it. 
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impingement is not enough; the Court has recognized that there must be more than 
an "incidental" impact on substantive rights to offend the REA.176 Thus, one could 
claim that the acknowledged adverse impact on the substantive rights of defendants 
that arises out of the relation back of new (but related) claims is insufficiently 
significant to conclude that the REA is violated thereby, given the full protection of 
the underlying substantive policy considerations behind limitations periods. That 
said, allowing for "incidental" impacts on substantive rights-a subjective concept 
which may vary by observer-has the potential to create a loophole of uncertain 
breadth, 177 undermining the greater certainty I seek to infuse into analyses under the 
REA. 
I confess to being tom between these competing perspectives. I think the most 
reasonable and workable stance may be the position that the relation back of new claims 
based on the same set of facts does not sufficiently interfere with the named defendant's 
substantive rights, given that defendants in such circumstances are on notice that their 
conduct relating to a specific incident has been challenged-albeit on alternate legal 
grounds-by the plaintiff within the applicable deadline. Ultimately, however, 
settling this point may be largely unnecessary: Virtually no state actually precludes 
relation back of claims under the circumstances outlined in Rule lS(c)(l)(B),178 
meaning the rule will likely never permit relation back under circumstances in which 
the relevant state would not.179 As a result, Rule lS(c)(l)(B) will not in practical 
terms abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. 
The more difficult question is whether Rule lS(c)(l)(C)-which permits the 
relation back of party changes-alters substantive rights in violation of the REA. 
Examining this question requires further elaboration of how Rule 15( c) works in this 
176. Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) ("Undoubtedly most alterations of the 
rules of practice and procedure may and often do affect the rights of litigants. Congress' 
prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights oflitigants was obviously not addressed to such 
incidental effects . . . .  "). 
1 77. Perhaps some (but not entirely satisfactory) aid can be supplied by conceptualizing an "incidental" 
effect as something less than an abridgement (curtailment), enlargement (expansion), or 
modification (revision) of the substantive right in question. 
178. See, e.g., ARIZ.R Cw.P.15(c)(l) ("An amendment relates back to thedate ofthe original pleading 
if the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth, or attempted to be set forth, in the original pleading."); Pointe San Diego 
Residential Cmty., L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 540, 549-
50 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) ("[A]n amendment relates back to the original complaint if the 
amendment: (1) rests on the same general set of facts; (2) involves the same injury; and (3) refers 
to the same instrumentality . . . .  [E]ven if the plaintiff alleges a different legal theory or new cause 
of action."). 
1 79. Maryland professes to have a relation back rule that is narrower than Rule 15, although the light 
between the two seems minute, if not nonexistent. See Youmans v. Douron, Inc., 65 A.3d 185, 
194-95 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013). 
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context. For example, if l file and serve a tort claim against Smith on June 29, one day 
before the expiration of the applicable two-year limitations period, and then, twenty 
days later on July 19, I amend my complaint to replace Smith with Jones (because I 
mistakenly had the wrong fellow), Rule lS(c)(l)(C) will permit the court to regard 
me as having asserted a claim against Jones ( the proper chap) on June 29, assuming 
Jones had knowledge of his status as the intended defendant no more than 90 days 
after the date the complaint was originally filed (here, June 29). I will have thereby 
avoided the consequences of initially commencing an action against Jones on July 
19; under ordinary circumstances, doing so would be untimely, and my claim would 
be vulnerable to the affirmative defense that the statute of limitations bars the 
action.180 However, thanks to Rule lS(c)(l)(C), that defense is no longer available 
and my claim may proceed. 
Or look at the same scenario from Jones' s perspective. The state has told Jones 
that June 30 of this year is my deadline to seek damages from him for his alleged 
tortious conduct that occurred two years prior, subject to whatever statutory or 
equitable tolling rules that state has provided.181 After June 30, then, Jones is 
protected from suit based on this conduct and may assert that protection as an 
affirmative defense that will defeat my claim because it has expired. Yet on July 19, 
documents served on him in a federal court action inform him-for the first time­
that this is not the case.182 
Are these effects really an abridgement of rights from the defendant's 
perspective, 183 or an enlargement of rights from the claimant's perspective? It would 
180. See FED. R Ov. P. S(c)(l) (listing "statute of limitations " as an affirmative defense); see also, e.g., 
Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("In 
most States the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, meaning that a consumer must 
appear in court and raise it in order to dismiss the suit."). 
181. See, e.g., GA. CODEANN. §9-2-61(a) (2017) ("When anycasehas been commenced in either a state 
or federal court within the applicable statute of limitations and the plaintiff discontinues or 
dismisses the same, it may be recommenced in a court of this state orin a federal court either within the 
original applicable period of limitations or within six months after the discontinuance or dismissal, 
whichever is later ....  "). 
182. This scenario presumes a state whose law would not permit relation back or tolling of the statute of 
limitations period under these circumstances. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Pac. Coast Bldg. Prods., Inc., 22 Cal 
Rptr. 3d 453,457 (Cal Ct. App. 2004): 
As a general rule, "an amended complaint that adds anew defendant does not relate back 
to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute oflimitationsis applied as of the 
date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed." But 
where an amendment does not add a "new'' defendant, but simply corrects a misnomer 
by which an "old" defendant was sued, case law recognizes an exception to the general 
rule ofno relation back. 
Id. at 457 (citations omitted) (quoting Woo v. Superior Court, 89 Cal Rptr. 2d 20, 24 (Cal Ct. App. 
1999)). 
183. Cf Hendersonv. United States,517U.S.654,676(1996) (Thomas,J.,dissenting) ("[T]heRulesEnabling 
Act . . .  expressly provides that the Federal Rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
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seem so, at least when entirely new defendants are named, because Rule 15( c)(l)( C) 
takes what the Supreme Court has described as "the right to be free of stale claims" -
a sense of repose, 184 if you will-and extinguishes it in favor of "the right to prosecute 
them."185 To explore this question, we will need to distinguish between state and 
federal limitations periods. 
a. State Statutes of Limitation 
The Supreme Court has made no bones about declaring that state limitations 
periods are substantive.186 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York187 is instructive: 
Is the outlawry, according to State law, of a claim created by the States a 
matter of 'substantive rights' to be respected by a federal court of equity 
when that court's jurisdiction is dependent on the fact that there is a State­
created right, or is such statute of 'a mere remedial character,' which a 
federal court may disregard?188 
Reference to "the outlawry" of a claim suggests that the claim is outlawed or barred 189 
once the period has expired. The Court was thus asking, is the fact that the claim is 
outlawed under state law a matter of substantive rights or merely a "remedial" 190 
concern? The Court answered this question by focusing not on terminology but on 
effect.191 A federal court "cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made 
right' Allowing [Suits in Admiralty Act] claims in which process is not served forthwith to proceed 
against the United States infringes upon the Government's immunity and thereby alters a substantive 
right in direct contravention oftheRulesEnablingAct." (quoting28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994)). 
184. See, e.g., Rendall-Speranz.a v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 917-18 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining the right of 
repose arises when the defendant did not know it would need to defend against claims); Ely, supra note 
5, at 726 (referring to "the feeling ofrelease, the assurance that the possibility ofordeal has passed, that a 
state seeks to create by enacting a statute oflimitations"). 
185. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent RR Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1%5) (describing the theory behind statutes of 
limitations as being that "the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to 
prosecute them" (quoting Order of RR Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 
(1944))). 
186. Lower courts have reached the same conclusion See, e.g., Barthel v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487,491 (5th Cir. 
1944) ("We agree that limitation is a matter of substance rather than of procedure . . . .  "). 
187. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
188. Id. at 107-08 (citation omitted). 
189. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("Mere delay, extending to the limit prescribed, 
is itself a conclusive bar."). 
190. Remedial is a tricky word here. The Court is using the term "remedial" in opposition to 
"substantive rights." Some might view this as indicating the court meant the term to be 
synonymous with "procedural," although it is possible to understand the term to mean a rule that 
addresses whether a substantive right violation can be judicially addressed. See supra note 79. 
191. Guar. Tr. Co., 326 U.S. at 109: 
It is therefore immaterial whether statutes of limitation are characterized either as 
'substantive' or 'procedural' in State court opinions in any use of those terms 
unrelated to the specific issue before us. Erie R Co. v. Tompkins was not an 
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unavailable by the State nor can it substantiallyaff ect the enforcement of the right as given 
by the State."192 Therefore, "a statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit if 
brought in a State court bears on a State-created right vitally and not merely formally 
or negligibly." 193 In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,194 the Court reaffirmed these 
views: "'We cannot give [ the cause of action] longer life in federal court than it 
would have had in the state court without adding something to the cause of 
action . . .  .' [U]nder York that statute of limitations was part of the state-law cause 
of action."195 
But perhaps York and Walker can only be used to affirm that the Court regards 
limitations periods as substantive only for Erie purposes, not necessarily for REA 
purposes. After all, the Court in Hanna said that the two tests are not identical and 
were created to serve different purposes.196 However, although there are distinctions 
between the two tests, what qualifies as a substantive right under each is not one of 
them. The REA expressly concerns itself with avoiding the adulteration of 
"substantive right [s] ,"197 which are defined as I have indicated above.198 The Erie 
Id. 
endeavor to formulate scientific legal terminology. It expressed a policy that 
touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial power between State and federal 
courts. In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a 
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship 
of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be 
substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as 
it would be if tried in a State court. 
192. Id. at 108-09. 
193. Id. at 110. 
194. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
195. Id. at 746 (quoting Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949)). 
Because the Court interpreted Rule 3 (Commencing an Action) as not applying to the issue of 
tolling a limitations period, see Walker, 446 U.S. at 7 46 ("We rejected the argument that Rule 3 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governed the manner in which an action was commenced in 
federal court for purposes of tolling the state statute of limitations."), it did not have to confront 
the issue of Rule 3' s validity under the REA. Id. at 7 49, 751 ("Application of the Hanna analysis is 
premised on a 'direct collision' between the Federal Rule and the state law. . . . Rule 3 governs the 
date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run, but does not 
affect state statutes of limitations."). However, with respect to Rule 15(c)( l)(C), "the clash is 
unavoidable," Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,470 (1965), because Rule 15(c)(l)(C) is a tolling 
provision. Thus, we cannot avoid the REA analysis. Walker, 466 U.S. at 749-50 ("The first 
question must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to 
control the issue before the Court. It is only if that question is answered affirmatively that the 
Hanna analysis applies."). 
196. 380 U.S. at 471 ("It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal 
courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and federal 'procedural' law, but from that it need not 
follow that the tests are identical. For they were designed to control very different sorts of 
decisions."). 
197. 28 U.S.C. §2072(b) (2018). 
1 98. See supra Subpart LB. I. 
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analysis, on the other hand, imposes a broader proscription on ad hoc, case-by-case 
judicial lawmaking that is measured by the effect such would have on litigant forum 
selection and equitable administration of the laws.199 An admonition to avoid 
interfering with substantive rights is certainly subsumed within that command, but 
does not reflect its outer limit. Thus, interference with substantive rights-defined 
similarly within each sphere-is prohibited under both regimes; Erie additionally 
proscribes interference with laws that, regardless of their label or characterization, 
would render federal diversity courts inappropriately distinctive from their local 
state counterparts. Another way of looking at it is that the REA' s directive is to avoid 
abridging, enlarging, or modifying substantive rights-what one could view as 
serious incursions-while the Erie doctrine is not so limited, prohibiting judicial 
interference with state legal rules, the ignoring of which would simply lead one to 
prefer federal court to state court ( or work an inequity on those not empowered to 
choose between forums). 
This lower bar for measuring offense to state prerogatives yields the wider 
aperture that the Erie lens provides as compared to that of the REA. In both domains, 
what is substantive is a constant; the tolerable adulteration thereof is what varies. 
Understood thusly, one can confidently assert that the York Court's labeling of 
limitations periods as substantive was not dependent on its Erie context. The affront 
in York rose to a level that would offend both regimes: By writing that "a statute that 
would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a State­
created right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly,"200 the Court indicated that 
the state-created right was being fundamentally-not incidentally-disturbed, the 
kind of interference that the REA expressly prohibits. I see no basis for reading York 
to suggest that stripped from its Erie context, statutes of limitations lose their 
substantive tenor. The original Advisory Committee apparently concurred, with its 
chair reporting, "The Committee concluded that statutes of limitation are matters of 
substantive law and not procedure . . . .  "201 
Returning to our discussion, the Court built on the foundation laid by York and 
Walker with respect to the substantive nature of limitations periods in Jinks v. 
Richland County,202 when it addressed the constitutionality of the tolling provision 
contained in the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute.203 The Jinks Court wrote: 
199. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468-69 (refining Erie's "twin aims " analysis). 
200. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) ( emphasis added). 
201. Mitchell,supra note 84, at 183. 
202. 538 U.S. 456 (2003). 
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) (2018) ("The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection(a), 
and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after 
the dismissal of the claim under subsection ( a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a 
period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period."). 
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For purposes of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, for example, statutes of 
limitations are treated as substantive. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 
U.S. 99 (1945). Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. 493, 506-07 (1870), provides 
ample support for the proposition that-if the substance-procedure 
dichotomy posited by respondent is valid-the tolling of limitations 
periods falls on the "substantive" side of the line. 204 
Upholding the federal statutory tolling provision depended on holding rules on 
statutes of limitations to be substantive, because of Congress's lack of constitutional 
authority to prescribe the procedure operative in state courts.205 More important for 
our purposes, however, the Court's determination that statutory tolling is 
substantive makes clear that tolling is not something a rule prescribed under the 
REA can do. The holding of Jinks was that Congress could impose on these state­
created substantive rights by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause;206 the 
Supreme Court does not enjoy that same power under the REA. 
Given that a statute of limitations period confers on defendants a substantive 
right "to be free of stale claims,"207 a Federal Rule that extinguishes that right for a 
person who was not sued on the same facts within the statutorily-prescribed period 
abridges that defendant's substantive rights.208 Rule lS(c)(l)(C) tolls the running of 
an applicable statute of limitations, a maneuver the Supreme Court in Jinks said was 
a substantive undertaking.209 And indeed it is, for one criterion of a claim's validity 
is its timeliness. Any rule that validates a claim regardless of when it is asserted­
notwithstanding its statutory lifespan-if a set of other conditions (for example, 
204. 538 U.S. at 465 (citations modified). Stewart v. Kahn stood for the proposition that Congress 
could toll state statutes of limitations pending the Civil War pursuant to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in aid of the President's war powers. Id. at 461-62. 
205. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (discussing constitutional limitations on 
Congress's ability to micromanage regulation by the states). 
206. 538 U.S. at 462. 
207. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 ( describing the theory behind statutes of limitations as being "that the right 
to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them"); see also lewis, 
supra note 169, at 1554 ("It is not controverted that a state's interest in the policies underlying the 
selection of a limitations period is a 'substantive' state concern to which a federal diversity court 
must defer."). 
208. Professor Ely suggested that the pwpose behind a "door-closing" rule should be consulted before 
determining the REA implications of interfering with it See Ely, supra note 5, at 733 ("Any rule that 
enforces its mandate by refusing to entertain, or dismissing, a suit is a door-closing rule. Here as 
elsewhere the nature of the state mandate thus enforced, and more specifically the concerns that 
gave rise to it, must be carefully scrutinized before the Enabling Act can be sensibly applied."). But 
he also acknowledged that the interests of repose furthered by statutes of limitation were indeed 
substantive. See id. at 726 ( describing as substantive those rules of law that foster and protect "the 
feeling of release, the assurance that the possibility of ordeal has passed, that a state seeks to create 
by enacting a statute oflimitations "). 
209. 538 U.S. at 465 ("[I]f the substance-procedure dichotomy posited by respondent is valid-the 
tolling of limitations periods falls on the 'substantive' side of the line."). 
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notice within ninety days of filing, awareness of the claimant's mistake, an 
understanding of having been the intended target) are met, is a rule of decision that 
displaces the ordinary timeliness rule, or at least alters substantive rights in ways 
prohibited by the REA.210 The claimant's rights are enlarged by reviving an 
extinguished claim or by giving the claim a longer life than the state has prescribed;2' 1 
the defendant's rights are abridged by subjecting him to liability from which he 
210. As the Court explained in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), in 
the context of declaring federal courts impotent to alter state limitations period tolling provisions 
via judge-made rules: 
Since that cause of action is created by local law, the measure ofit is to be found only 
in local law. It carries the same burden and is subject to the same defenses in the 
federal court as in the state court. It accrues and comes to an end when local law so 
declares. Where local law qualifies or abridges it, the federal court must follow suit. 
Otherwise there is a different measure of the cause of action in one court than in the 
other, and the principle ofErie R Co. v. Tompkins is transgressed. 
Id. at 533 ( citations omitted). 
211. As the Court remarked in Ragan, "We cannot give [the cause of action] longer life in the federal 
court than it would have had in the state court without adding something to the cause of action." 
33 7 U.S. at 533-34. It is Erie that gives rise to this restriction when informal judge-made rules are 
at issue. Id. at 534. The REA imposes the same restriction when the Supreme Court's prospective, 
supervisory rules of procedure are in question, for "adding something to the cause of action" 
would be enlarging a substantive right. See Michelle L. Nabors, Relation Back of Amendments 
Adding Plaintiffs Under Rule 15(c), 66 OKLA. L. REv. 113, 152-53 (2013) ("Recognizing the 
substantive policy behind statutes of limitations, some courts have been wary of expanding a 
plaintiff's right to bring a lawsuit. Because substantive rights may not be enlarged or modified by 
procedural rule, interpreting the rule in a way that does so would 'run afoul of the Rules Enabling 
Act."' (quoting Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co. of Pa., 233 F.RD. 429, 435 (W.D. Pa. 
2005))). 
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would otherwise be protected.212 The transgression of the REA' s mandates, it would 
seem, could not be more clear.213 
The inferior federal courts to confront this specific question have largely 
reached a different conclusion, upholding the validity of Rule 15( c) under the REA.214 
212. To be clear, many states permit the relation back of party changes under the circumstances 
endorsed by the Federal Rules. See, e.g., ARIZ. R Civ. P. 15( c) (2) (providing for relation back under 
conditions identical to those found in Federal Rule lS(c)(l)(C)). In such states, no rights are 
altered because the relation back that is permissible in federal court does not vary at all from that 
which may occur in state court under state rules. However, in states that do not recognize relation 
back under the conditions approved by Federal Rule lS(c)(l)(C), the problematic alteration of 
rights discussed in the main text occurs. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Pac. Coast Bldg. Prods., Inc., 22 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 453,457 (Cal.Ct. App. 2004) ("[A]n amended complaint that adds a new defendant does 
not relate back to the date of filing the original complaint and the statute of limitations is applied 
as of the date the amended complaint is filed, not the date the original complaint is filed." ( quoting 
Woo v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 24 ( Cal Ct. App. 1999) ). In states with more generous 
relation back rules, see, e.g., IDAHO R Civ. P. lS(c)(l)(C) (providing a six-month grace period 
rather than the ninety days provided in Federal Rule 15( c )( 1) ( C) ), the Federal Rule does not alter 
any substantive rights because litigants may access the more generous state relation-back rules via 
Rule 15(c)(l)(A). See, e.g., Charlot v. Ecolab, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 3d 40, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ("Under 
Rule lS(c)(l)(A), 'if the applicable statute of limitations is determined by state law . . .  courts 
should assess both the state and federal relation back doctrines and apply whichever law is more 
generous."' ( quoting Anderson v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 09 Civ. 7082(ER)(PED), 2014 WL 
1877092, at *2 (Mar. 28,2014 S.D.N.Y))); see also FED.R Cw. P. lS(c)(l)(A) advisory committee's 
note to 1991 amendment (adding Rule lS(c)(l)(A) in 1991 "to make it clear that [Rule 15] does 
not apply to preclude any relation back that may be permitted under the applicable limitations 
law . . . .  [I]f that law affords a more forgiving principle of relation back than the one provided in 
this rule, it should be available to save the claim."). 
21 3. Professor Carrington reached a different conclusion, finding Rule 15( c )' s relation back provisions 
to be valid based on his functional approach to understanding the REA See Carrington, supra 
note 5, at 310-13; supra note 169. He saw the relation back rule as procedural because it pertained 
to the operation of the courts and as not abridging substantive rights because "it is difficult to 
imagine a group that might form a political unity around such an abstruse idea with so little 
foreseeable impact on identifiable persons." Carrington, supra note 5, at 311. Professor Burbank, 
however, ably rebutted Carrington' s argument: 
Both the prospective formulation of a limitations period-two years or four 
years?-and the prospective formulation of a rule to determine when that period 
ceases to run in response to litigation activity-filing or service?-involve policy 
choices . . . .  They are not, contrary to Professor Carrington's view, suitable 
subjects for court rules. Neither is it appropriate for a court rule, under the guise of 
"relation back," to permit a new party to be haled into court beyond the period of 
the applicable limitations period, at least when there is no relationship between the 
original and new parties. 
Burbank, Hold the Corks, supra note 85, at 1020. 
214. See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,ARTHURR MillER &MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1503, at 238 (3d ed. 2010) ("[N]o federal court has suggested that the rule either is 
unconstitutional or is beyond the scope of the Rules Enabling Act. On the contrary, several cases 
have expressly held that the Hanna case settles the issue in favor of the application of Rule 15( c ). "); 
see, e.g., Johansen v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 1380 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Rule 
15( c) is a truly procedural rule because it governs the in-court dispute resolution processes rather 
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For example, in Morel v. DaimlerChrysler A G,
215 the First Circuit faced a challenge to 
Rule 15( c )' s validity because it was being applied to permit the relation back of a party 
change well after the expiration of the applicable limitations period. 216 The court in 
Morel-to its credit-acknowledged the two wings of the REA analysis, separately 
analyzing whether Rule 15(c) was a procedural rule and whether it abridged 
substantive rights.217 After determining that the rule was procedural because it only 
concerned the manner in which the dispute was adjudicated,218 it concluded that the 
defendant's rights would not be abridged by permitting relation back. Here is the 
court's entire analysis on that point: 
Moreover, even though Rule 15(c) is "intimately connected with the 
policy of the statute of limitations," Fed.R.Civ.P. 15( c) advisory 
committee notes (1966 Amendment), the Rule does not actually alter 
state limitations periods. Under Rule 15(c), the original complaint still 
must be filed within that state-supplied limitations period. So viewed, 
"[t]he state's underlying interest . . .  in protecting persons against stale 
claims is adequately protected by the practical notice requirements built 
into Rule 15(c)." Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606,612 (4th Cir. 
1980); see 19 Wright et al., supra § 4509, at 273-75.219 
There are four problems with this analysis. First, the court relied on pre-1991 
support (both from case law and the rulemakers), but it was in 1991 that Rule 15 was 
amended to allow the relation back of party changes when defendants first learn of 
the action outside of the limitations period, something that was not possible before. 220 
So it is not surprising that pre-1991 authorities would see less of an REA problem 
(although a similar problem existed then too). Second, the claim is not that Rule 
15( c) alters state limitations periods. Rather, the claim is that Rule 15( c )( 1 )( C) tolls 
applicable state limitations periods, a fact that is undeniable. As a tolling provision, 
Rule 15(c)(l)(C) is without question engaging in prospective regulation permitted 
to Congress but not the courts; it is also abridging the right of repose that a limitations 
period ensures. Third, the quotation from Davis is disingenuous, as that case did not 
than the dispute that brought the parties into court; consequently, it does not transgress the Rules 
Enabling Act."). 
215. 565 F.3d 20 (1st Cir.2009). 
216. Id. at23. 
217. Id. at 24. 
218. Id. at 24 (Rule lS(c) "is a truly procedural rule because it governs the in-court dispute resolution 
processes rather than the dispute that brought the parties into court" ( quoting Johansen, 810 F.2d 
at 1380)). 
219. Id. at 25. 
220. Rule lS(c), prior to the 1991 amendment,required notice to thenew defendant "within the period 
provided by law for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by amendment." 
FED.R Civ.P. lS(c) (1988) (repealed 1991). 
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involve the tardy naming of a new party as a defendant, but an amendment to reflect 
the plaintiff's post-limitations-period appointment as an administrator for the 
estate of the decedent. Thus, the defendant's right of repose and protection against 
stale claims was not at issue, having been named as a defendant in the suit 
originally.221 Finally, although the court here felt that Rule 15(c) adequately 
protected the interests that the state sought to protect in imposing a limitations 
period, that is a subjective determination with which I disagree when newly-named 
defendants are at issue. Further, circumventing the applicable limitations period 
based on such considerations is tolling pure and simple, which, again, the REA does 
not authorize the Supreme Court to do through its rulemaking power. It turns out, 
then, that this court's analysis-which typifies the acceptance of Rule 15( c )' s validity 
from other quarters222-should not carry much weight. 
b. Federal Statutes of Limitation 
Are substantive rights abridged when Rule 15( c) ( 1) ( C) tolls a federal statute of 
limitations? The REA restrains the Supreme Court from prescribing procedural 
rules that alter "any" substantive right-not just state substantive rights.223 However, 
federal courts may possess more authority to interfere with federal statutes of 
limitation than with state statutes. As we have just seen, the REA does not authorize 
rules abridging the protections granted by state statutes of limitations. Neither could 
221 . Additionally, as one commentator has argued, the REA was violated by application of Rule 15( c) 
in Davis because it "enlarged, or at least modified, the substantive rights of the plaintiffby allowing 
him to bring a suit that the state court would not have entertained." Johnson, supra note 169, at 
641. 
222. See, e.g., Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d 249, 250 (3d Cir. 1972) (amendment changing party 
defendant may relate back because Rule 15( c) "is entirely a matter of Federal practice"); Meredith 
v. United Airlines, 41 F.RD. 34, 40 (S.D. Cal. 1966) ("Lockheed could not argue that § 2072 
prohibits applying amended Rule 15(c) to achieve a relation back of the Amended 
Complaint. . . .  [U]nder the facts here, Lockheed has no benefit or right under the California 
statute of limitations of which it is conceivably being deprived."); Westen & Lehman, supra note 
12, at 364 ("[R]ule 15(c) should be deemed valid because, while it intrudes to some extent upon 
substantive rights under the state law, the intrusion is too slight to violate the statutory 
presumption of validity."). 
223. Indeed, the REA was passed at a time when Congress must have been contemplating federal 
substantive rights, as the 1938 Erie decision-which brought about federal court solicitude for 
state substantive law-had yet to be decided. See Burbank, Rules Enabling Act, supra note 5, at 
1109-10: 
It is not surprising that the preservation of state law, as such, was not a primary 
concern when the Act was formulated or when it was passed. Even in 1934, Erie 
wasfour years away. In the l920's, Swiftv. Tyson [41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)] was in 
full bloom, and Erie was considered by most to be an impossibility. Moreover, the 
Federal Rules contemplated by the Act were to apply in all civil actions tried in 
federal court, including those in which federal law furnished the rule of decision. 
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such abridgment be accomplished by federal courts without formal rules; the direct 
proscription of Erie and York would apply, obligating federal courts to apply the 
same limitations and tolling rules that would otherwise apply to state law claims in 
state court.224 
When the source of the limitations period is a federal statute, however, Erie 
poses no barrier.225 Notwithstanding that federal limitations periods are no less 
substantive in nature than their state-law based counterparts, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that federal courts may equitably toll federal limitations periods when 
doing so is consistent with the underlying "legislative scheme" in question.226 This 
was done, for example, in Burnett v. New York Central Railroad Co.,227 where the 
Court permitted a time-barred claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act to 
go forward based on its determination that the filing of the same claim in state court 
within the limitations period tolled the statute.228 Understand, though, that 
equitable tolling is a judicial function that a court undertakes in the context of a live 
controversy, ascertaining whether the facts of the case at hand warrant bypassing the 
bar that an expired limitations period would otherwise impose.229 
Whether the Supreme Court may-untethered from adjudication-prescribe 
supervisory, prospective rules of procedure that toll federal statutes of limitation is 
another matter. It is not clear that an express tolling provision would be properly 
viewed as a rule of procedure in light of the Court's statement that "the tolling of 
limitations periods falls on the 'substantive' side of the line."230 Imagine a Federal 
Rule that read as follows: "All claims arising under federal law previously asserted in 
224. Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326U.S. 99,99 (1945). See, e.g., Walker, 446U.S. at746 (indicating that state 
law governs the tolling of state limitations periods in federal diversity actions). 
225. See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.l (2d Cir. 1956) 
(" [T]he Erie doctrine is inapplicable to claims or issues created and governed by federal law, even 
if the jurisdiction of the federal court rests on diversity of citizenship."). 
226. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 557-58 (1974) ("The proper test is not whether a 
time limitation is 'substantive' or 'procedural,' but whether tolling the limitation in a given context 
is consonant with the legislative scheme."); see also Y oungv. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) 
("It is hombook law that limitations periods are 'customarily subject to equitable tolling,' unless 
tolling would be 'inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute."' (quoting Irwin v. Dep't of 
Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,95 (1990); United Statesv. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38,48 (1998))). 
227. 380 U.S. 424 (1965). 
228. Id. at 428-29; see also Herb v. Pitcairn, 325 U.S. 77, 78-79 (1945) (permitting previous filing in 
local state court as sufficient to satisfy statute oflimitations period in a Federal Employers' Liability 
Act case, even though that prior action was dismissed). 
229. United Statesv. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (2015) ("[A] court usually may pause the 
running of a limitations statute in private litigation when a party 'has pursued his rights diligently 
but some extraordinary circumstance' prevents him from meeting a deadline." ( quoting Lozano 
v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014))). 
230. Jinksv. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456,465 (2003). Stewart v. Kahn stood for the proposition that 
Congress could toll state statutes oflimitations pending the Civil War pursuant to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause in aid of the President's war powers. 
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state court and dismissed without prejudice may be refiled in federal court, 
notwithstanding the expiration of any applicable statute of limitations, for up to 1 
year following the dismissal." Such a rule would directly affect a claim's validity. 
Further, as in the state law context, it would eliminate the protection from suit that a 
defendant otherwise would enjoy, a seeming abridgment of substantive rights. 
Thus, quite apart from whether a federal court could equitably toll the operative 
federal statute of limitations period under the circumstances reflected in the text of 
this fictitious rule, the Supreme Court's attempt to do so-through its delegated 
rulemaking authority-prospectively in all cases throughout the federal courts 
would not appear consistent with the REA. 
How, then, can one explain American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,231 in 
which the Court seemed to interpret Rule 23 to toll a federal statute of limitations 
period? The Court was faced with a class action filed under the Sherman Act;232 the 
action was commenced prior to the expiration of the applicable limitations period, 
supplied by the Clayton Act.233 Shortly after the district court denied class 
certification, the unnamed members of the class moved to intervene in the action 
under Rule 24,234 although by this time the limitations period had expired.235 The 
Supreme Court held that the original filing of the action by the purported class 
representative tolled the limitations period,236 which ultimately meant that the 
previously unnamed class members could be permitted to intervene to assert their 
claims.237 
Although at first glance it may appear that the American Pipe Court held that 
Rule 23 tolled the federal limitations period, this would not be an accurate 
characterization. Instead, the Court was either engaging in equitable tolling of the 
kind previously discussed or exercising its federal common lawmaking authority. 238 
231 .  414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
232. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 ( codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 
(2018)). 
233. 15 u.s.c. § 16(i) (2018). 
234. FED.R C!v. P. 24. 
235. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 543-44 (1974). 
236. Id. at 552-53 ("We hold that in this posture, at least where class action status has been denied solely 
because of failure to demonstrate that the 'class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable,' the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running of the statute for all 
purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit 
inappropriateforclassactionstatus." (quoting FmRCiv.P.23(a)(l))). 
237. Id. at 552-53, 561. 
238. Professors Burbank and Wolff argue thattheAmericanPipetollingruleconstitutes an exercise offederal 
common law. SeeStephenB. Burbank&TobiasBarrington Wolff, Gass Actions, Statutes of Limitations 
and Repose, and Federal Common Law, 167 U. PAL. REV. 1, 29 (2018). However, the Court's own view 
is that American Pipe tolling was an exercise of the Court's "traditional equitable powers." Cal. Pub. 
Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2051-52 (2017). I do not quarrel with Burbank's and 
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A federal court may equitably toll an applicable federal limitations period in a given 
case based on the facts and circumstances before it, provided doing so is consistent 
with Congress's legislative scheme.239 In American Pipe, the legislative scheme that 
the Court took into account in deciding that tolling was warranted included Rule 23 
itself: "Since the imposition of a time bar would not in this circumstance promote the 
purposes of the statute of limitations, the tolling rule we establish here is consistent 
both with the procedures of Rule 23 and with the proper function of the limitations 
statute."240 However, in doing so, the Court was not invoking Rule 23 as the source 
of the tolling in question;241 rather, it could be seen as identifying Rule 23 as a 
component of the "legislative scheme" with which its tolling had to be 
consistent,242 or as the embodiment of the federal aggregate litigation policy that 
the American Pipe tolling rule was designed to uphold. 243 
In Brever v. Federated Equity Management Co. of Pennsylvania,244 the district 
court appreciated the impropriety of letting Rule lS(c) toll an applicable federal 
limitations period when it rejected an effort of substitute plaintiffs to avail themselves 
Wolff sviews on this point and willreadilyconcedethattheconception of American Pipe that the Court 
offers may be off the mark The important point is that under neither view is Rule 23 itself a tolling 
provision, which is what matters for my purposes. 
239. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 414 U.S. at 557-58 ("The proper test is not whether a time limitation is 
'substantive' or 'procedural,' but whether tolling the limitation in a given context is consonant with the 
legislative scheme."). 
240. Id. at 555. 
241 . See Cal Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys., 137 S. Ct. at205 l -52. The court writes: 
Id. 
As this discussion indicates, the source of the tolling rule applied inAmerican Pipe is the 
judicial power to promote equity, rather than to interpret and enforce statutory 
provisions. Nothing in theAmericanPipeopinionsuggeststhatthetollingrule it created 
was mandated by the text of a statute or federal rule. Nor could it have. The central text 
at issue in American Pipe was Rule 23, and Rule 23 does not so much as mention the 
extension or suspension of statutory time bars. 
The Court's holding was instead grounded in the traditional equitable powers of 
the judiciary. 
242. SeeLozanov.MontoyaAlvarez,572U.S. 1, 10-11 (2014). The court writes: 
As applied to federal statutes oflimitations, the inquiry begins with the understanding 
that Congress "legislate[s] against a background of common-law adjudicatory 
principles." Equitable tolling, a long-established feature of American jurisprudence 
derived from "the old chancery rule," is just such a principle. We therefore presume that 
equitable tolling applies if the period in question is a statute oflimitations and iftolling is 
consistentwith the statute. 
Id. (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); Holmberg v. 
Armbrecht, 327U.S. 392, 397 (1946)). 
243. Burbank & Wolff, supra note 5, at 29 ("American Pipe tolling is a federal common-law doctrine 
crafted by the Supreme Court to carry into effect the provisions of Rule 23 and the policies they 
embody: to preserve efficiency in aggregate litigation and protect the opt-out right that absentees 
enjoy in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action."). 
244. 233 F.RD. 429 (W.D. Pa. 2005). 
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of Rule 15( c) to access additional damages. After an initial plaintifflost standing in a 
securities fraud case, substitute plaintiffs joined the action through an amended 
complaint, but sought to claim damages for one year prior to the previous plaintiffs 
initiation of the action; this was necessary due to the statute's limitation of 
damages, 245 making them recoverable for only one year prior to the commencement 
of the action.246 The court found that if the substitute plaintiffs were permitted to 
have their claims relate back under Rule 15(c), that "would effectively toll the 
substantiative [sic] damage limitation . . .  without an equitable basis warranting such 
relief' and "create substantive rights by application of a procedural rule and thus run 
afoul of the Rules Enabling Act."247 
3. Can Rule 15(c)(I)(C) be Fixed? 
Given the conflict between what the REA says that a Federal Rule cannot do­
"abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right" -and the revelation that Rule 
15( c )( 1 )( C) does precisely that ( expanding the rights of claimants at the expense of 
defendants' right of repose), what can be done to correct this transgression? As a 
reminder, Rule 15(c)(l)(C) is a tolling provision that relieves claimants of the 
consequences of applicable federal and state statutes of limitations for tardily 
asserted claims against new defendants if the claim was timely filed against another 
defendant, if-within ninety days-the new defendant had notice of the action 
sufficient to make it aware that it was the intended party originally, and if the failure 
to name the new defendant initially was due to a mistake.248 The problem with this 
is that a newly named defendant, who otherwise would be protected from claims 
asserted after the statutory deadline, is not. A couple of possible fixes come to mind. 
a. Misnomer Correction 
First, Rule 15( c )( 1)( C) could be amended to restrict party-change relation back 
to simple misnomer correction. A plaintiff who files an action against John Smith 
and serves that person, only to find out that the proper spelling of the man's name is 
Jon Smythe, should be able to have an amendment that corrects the error relate back 
to the original time of filing. Mr. Smythe' s right of repose has not been abridged, as 
the initial action served on him gave him actual notice that a claim based on the 
245. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3) (2018) ("No award of damages shall be recoverable for any period prior 
to one year before the action was instituted."). 
246. Brever, 233 F.RD. at43l-32. 
247. Id. at432, 435. 
248. FmR Civ. P. lS(c)(l)(C). 
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described set of facts was being asserted. This asswnes that the proper defendant was 
served and the action was commenced within the time prescribed by the applicable 
law.249 Although permitting relation back under such circwnstances is not 
uncontroversial, it would be a fairly narrow allowance. 
Could the understanding of misnomer be broader? In Schiavone v. Fortune, 250 
the Court faced a broader instance of misnomer when "Fortune" -not an entity but 
rather a trademark for a magazine-was named as the defendant in a defamation 
case.251 When the plaintiffs tried to substitute the corporate entity that published 
Fortune as the defendant, it was too late because the limitations period had 
expired.252 The Supreme Court famously denied relation back under a previous 
version of Rule 15 that lacked the current permissive and expansive language it has 
today.253 Indeed, the relation back provision of Rule 15 was amended to its current 
form as an effort to overturn Schiavone.254 However, as is well known, Rule 15 
permits relation back under circwnstances far beyond the facts of Schiavone. 
Amending Rule 15( c) ( 1) ( C) to focus on misnomers of the kind reflected in that case 
would bring the rule back in conformity with the REA. This could be achieved by 
the following alteration: 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. 
(1) When an Amendment Relates Back. An amendment to a pleading 
relates back to the date of the original pleading when: 
( C) the amendment changes the party or corrects the naming of the party 
against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(l)(B) is satisfied, and if, 
within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and 
complaint, the correctly named party to be brought in by 
amendment.was served with the original or amended pleading. 
(i) recei¾,ed such notice of the action that it ,,vill not be prejudiced in 
defending on the merits; and 
(ii) lmew or should ha·,ce lmown that the action would ha·,ce been brought 
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. 
249. In many states, an action is not commenced for limitations purposes until the defendant is served 
in the action. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-30 (2014) ("An action is commenced as to each 
defendant when the summons is served on him . . . .  "). 
250. 477 U.S. 21 (1986). 
251. Id. at22-23. 
252. Id. at 24. 
253. Id. at 27,29-30. 
254. FED.RCiv.P. lS(c)(l)(C)advisorycommittee's noteto 1991 amendment ("This paragraph [now 
(c)(l)(C)] has been revised to change the result in Schiavone v. Fortune . . .  with respect to the 
problem of a misnamed defendant."). 
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This revised language makes clear that it protects only misnomer correction, 
addressing a merely formal defect. The proper party has been identified but the 
name used to refer to that party was incorrect. The rule confines itself to 
technicalities associated with adjudicating the claim and refrains from disrupting the 
rights between the parties established under the applicable limitations law. If service 
of process has already occurred, there would be no need to re-serve the summons 
and complaint; the amended complaint would be served under Rule 5.255 If service 
of process has yet to occur, formal service of the summons and amended complaint 
under Rule 4 could ensue. Courts would retain discretion to extend the ninety-day 
deadline for service for "good cause" if the court felt that the circumstances 
surrounding the misnomer correction warranted an extension.256 This rule would 
not-and could not-alter operative state law governing the commencement of 
actions,257 meaning that if a state requires filing and service of process within a 
limitations period,258 nothing in the above proposal would circumvent that. 
What this language would not address, however, is a true misidentification 
scenario.259 When a plaintiff names and serves the wrong party, under a 
misapprehension of who bears responsibility for the injuries the claim seeks to 
vindicate, that is not a merely formal defect. True indeed, the subsequent discovery 
of the proper party would warrant an amendment substituting that party as a 
defendant. But to permit such an amendment to relate back and avoid the 
intervening expiration of the applicable limitations period would work the very 
abridgment of substantive rights we have already identified as flowing from Rule 
15( c )( 1)( C) in its current form.260 By instituting an action near the expiration of the 
limitations period, a plaintiff assumes the risk that she will not be able to revise her 
255. FmR Civ.P.5(b). 
256. FED. R Civ. P. 4(m). 
257. Walker,446 U.S. at 750-52. 
258. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2-30 (2014) ("An action is commenced as to each defendant 
when the summons is served on him . . . .  "). 
259. Thus, this proposed revision would make Rule 15( c) (1) ( C) consistent with the approach taken in 
several states. See, e.g., Kaye v. Town of Manchester, 568 A.2d 459, 462 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990) 
(" [I]f the amendment is deemed to be a substitution or entire change of a party, it will not be 
permitted. If the amendment does not affect the identity of the party sought to be described in the 
complaint, but merely corrects the description of that party, the amendment will be allowed." 
( citations omitted)). 
260. The fact that the newly named defendant must have had notice of the action within 90 days of its 
filing and that the action was intended to be brought against it does not eliminate the affront to 
substantive rights, because such notice occurs after the expiration of the limitations period 
when-under state law-the claim has become inert. Further, even if notice occurred within the 
limitations period, using that fact to extinguish the defendant's statute of limitations defense is 
equitable tolling that cannot be achieved by prospective rulemaking. 
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action to add new parties uncovered in the discovery process. 261 Thus, although the 
rulemakers intended misidentification to be protected by Rule lS(c) when it was 
revised in 1991,262 the revision proposed above does not. 
b. Privity 
An even broader allowance for relation back might permit party changes to 
relate back if the newly named party is legally or otherwise related to the originally 
named defendant in a relevant way. This is the approach taken to the relation back 
of party changes in many states263 and reflects the circumstances under which the 
Supreme Court permitted relation back in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A.264 For 
example, if a plaintiff names ABC, Inc. as the defendant but the proper defendant 
should be XYZ, Inc. ( the corporate parent of ABC) could Rule 15 be revised to permit 
the naming ofXYZ to relate back to the time of filing without violating the REA? The 
problem in this situation is that ABC, not XYZ, is the party served. XYZ may not be 
named and served until after the ninety-day grace period for service has expired. 
Permitting an amendment occurring outside of that period to relate back to the 
original filing would strip XYZ of the protection that it should enjoy (assuming 
that state law would not permit relation back under such circumstances). For this 
reason, it would be inappropriate for a Federal Rule to be the basis for tolling the 
operative limitations period. Even though equitable considerations might warrant 
tolling under these circumstances because the naming of a corporate relative as a 
defendant within the limitations period could be said to obligate the subsidiary to 
notify its parent of the pendency of an action, equitable tolling of state or federal 
limitations periods, as previously discussed, is outside the scope of what the Supreme 
Court's prospective, supervisory rules can do.265 
c. Congressional Enactment 
An alternate fix would be for Congress to enact the tolling provision of Rule 
lS(c)( l)(C) legislatively as an Act of Congress (either as a statute or as a 
261. Cf Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428 (" [T]he courts ought to be relieved of the burden of trying stale claims 
when a plaintiffhas slept on his rights."). 
262. FED. R Civ. P.15(c)(l) advisory committee's notes to 1991 amendment ("[A] complaint may be 
amended at any time to correct a formal defect such as a misnomer or misidentification."). 
263. See, e.g., Kozich v. Shahady, 702 So. 2d 1289, 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("The addition of a 
party, however, does relate back where the new and former parties have an identity of interest 
which does not prejudice the opponent."). 
264. 560 U.S. 538, 557 (2010) (permitting relation back of an amendment changing the named 
defendant in the action). 
265. See supra Subpart II.A.2. 
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component of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).266 The Supreme Court has 
already affirmed Congress's authority to enact legislation that tolls state limitations 
periods,267 and its authority to toll federal limitations periods is unquestioned. It is a 
policy question whether the rule in its current form is worthy of enactment without 
alternation. That is, Congress would need to consider whether limitations periods 
should be tolled under the indicated circumstances.268 But our concern here-the 
REA violation posed by Rule 15(c)(l)(C) in those states where it makes a 
difference-would disappear were Congress to enact it into law.269 
d Abrogation 
A final option to bring Rule 15 in compliance with the REA would be to abrogate 
Rule 15( c )( 1)( C) ( and possibly Rule 15( c )( l)(B) as well, since it does not go beyond what 
every state would recognize), which would make federal and state relation-back rules 
completely symmetrical in the party-change context.270 There is precedent for 
relying on local law in the Federal Rules. For example, Rule 4 permits service 
consistent with the law of the forum state271 and incorporates state law pertaining to 
personal jurisdiction.272 Rule 64 makes available in federal court remedies that are 
266. Cf, e.g., Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527 (amending subdivisions (a), (c), (d), 
(e), and (g) of Rule 4 and adding subdivision (j)); Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 678-
79 (1996) ("[T]he Rules Enabling Act is 'technically inapplicable' in this case because Rule 4(j) was 
not promulgated by this Court but rather was enacted by Congress, and the Rules Enabling Act by 
its terms nullifies only statutory rules of procedure that conflict with rules promulgated by the 
Supreme Court." ( citations omitted)). 
26 7. Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 461-62 (2003 ). Tolling state limitations periods would be 
constitutional because it is sufficiently connected to "carrying into execution Congress's power " 
to constitute inferior federal courts and "assure that those tribunals may fairly and efficiently 
exercise ' [ t ]he judicial Power of the United States."' Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594, 
606-07 (2018) (quoting/inks, 538 U.S. at 462). 
268. I believe it would be fine for tolling of the kind permitted under Rule 15(c)(l)(C) to remain the 
rule ( enacted by Congress) for claims arising under federal law. However, it seems inappropriate 
to permit the tolling of state statutes of limitation in federal court when such tolling would not 
occur under the applicable state's law. 
269. The fact that the rules only take effect under the current system if Congress fails to enact legislation 
blocking them does not equate to congressional enactment, which requires affirmative bicameral 
approval and executive signature ( or veto override) of a rule, not just its passive acceptance. U.S. 
CONST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2. Were congressional acquiescence sufficient to justify rules that exceed the 
authorization of the REA, the REA would be pointless and would provide no constraint on 
rulemaking beyond what Congress itself could do. 
270. What would remain is what is now Rule 15( c)(l )(A): "An amendment to a pleading relates back 
to the date of the original pleading when the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations 
allows relation back " FED. R Cw. P.15(c)(l)(A). 
271. FmR Civ.P.4(e)(l),(g),(h)(l)(A). 
272. Id. 4(k)(l )(A). But see infra Subpart II.BJ for a discussion of the problem with Rule 4(k) under 
the REA. 
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available under the forum state's law.273 Although these rules ensure that there will 
be variation on these matters from one district court to the next, that has not been 
viewed as problematic from a policy perspective and is irrelevant from an REA­
compliance perspective. To the contrary, expressly yielding to the tolling and 
relation-back provisions found in the applicable state or federal law would honor the 
REA' s prohibition against ex ante judicial regulation of such affairs. 
B. Rule 4(k) & Rule 4(n) 
Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the personal jurisdiction of 
federal courts in subdivisions (k) and (n). In Rule 4(k), personal jurisdiction is 
deemed to exist under several enumerated circumstances: ( 1) if the defendant would be 
subject to the jurisdiction of a court of the forum state;274 (2) if the party is joined 
under Rule 14 or 19 and is served within a judicial district not more than 100 miles 
from the courthouse from which the summons emanated;275 (3) if authorized by a 
federal statute;276 and ( 4) when the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state 
court and the claim is under federal law, if personal jurisdiction would be consistent 
with the U.S. Constitution.277 Rule 4(n) provides that federal courts may assert 
jurisdiction over property if authorized by a federal statute278 or, when personal 
jurisdiction cannot otherwise be obtained due to an inability to serve process, a 
federal court may assert jurisdiction over the defendant's assets found in the 
district. 279 How do these provisions measure up against the REA? 
1. Are Rules 4(k) and 4(n) Rules of Practice or Procedure? 
The most glaring problem with subdivisions (k) and (n) of Rule 4 is that 
they are jurisdictional rules, not procedural rules. Recall our earlier discussion 
about the distinction between the two.280 Procedural rules must be confined to 
addressing the manner in which adjudication occurs. Jurisdictional rules address a 
court's power to entertain a matter at all. Congress-not the courts-has the 
authority to delineate the jurisdictional reach of the inferior federal courts. 281 
273. FED. R Clv. P. 64. 
274. FED. R Clv. P. 4(k)(l)(A). 
275. Id. 4(k)(l)(B). 
276. Id. 4(k)(l)(C). 
277. Id. 4(k)(2). 
278. Id. 4(n)(l) . 
279. Id. 4(n)(2). 
280. See supra Subpart I.A. 
281 . See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, 18; see also supra note 67. 
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The question is whether the REA conferred on the Supreme Court the authority 
to prescribe jurisdictional rules. Again, as previously discussed, jurisdictional 
rules are expressly beyond the remit granted by the REA, as the power conferred 
is limited to "rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence." 
One possible rejoinder to this analysis could be to point out that Rule 4(k) 
is concerned with addressing the "Territorial Limits of Effective Service" and 
that service of process is a procedural matter. 282 Although one might have been 
able to defend the predecessor to Rule 4(k)283 in this way, the defense does not 
ring true for Rule 4(k) and Rule 4(n) today. First, the quoted heading is limited 
to Rule 4(k), and does not apply to Rule 4(n). The heading for Rule 4(n) is 
"Asserting Jurisdiction over Property or Assets."284 Second, the heading of Rule 
4(k) belies its actual operation; the text of the rule-which is what counts,285 and 
which has been in place since 1993-pronounces, "Serving a summons or filing 
a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant" under 
subsequently enumerated circumstances.286 Thus, Rule 4(k) does not actually 
create a geographical region within which service of process will be effective­
which is precisely what original Rule 4(f) did and what Rule 45 does with 
respect to third-party subpoenas287-but instead outlines the conditions under 
which "personal jurisdiction" is "establishe [d]". Indeed, service of process is 
about more than notice; it is the very means by which a court asserts its 
282. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(l)(A). The quoted language is the heading of Rule 4(k). 
283. As originally adopted in 1938, Rule 4(f) read: "TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF EFFECTIVE SERVICE. 
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of 
the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute of the United States so 
provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state. A subpoena may be served within the 
territorial limits provided in Rule 45." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (1938). 
284. Id. 4(n). 
285. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947) 
(referencing "the wise rule that the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot 
limit the plain meaning of the text "); see also Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, 
Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (" [ S]tatutory titles and section headings 'are tools available for 
the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute."' (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 
U.S. 516, 528 (2002))). 
286. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)( l). Were confirmation needed from the Advisory Committee notes 
(though it is not), they state that Rule 4(k) is indeed intended to authorize the court's 
exercise of personal jurisdiction: "Paragraph (1) . . .  explicitly authoriz [es] the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over persons who can be reached under state long-arm law " and 
"Paragraph (2) . . .  authorizes the exercise of territorial jurisdiction over the person of any 
defendant against whom is made a claim arising under any federal law if that person is 
subject to personal jurisdiction in no state." FED. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee's notes 
to 1993 amendment. 
287. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)( l)(A), (d)(3)(A)(ii) (limiting the subpoena power of district courts to 
a 100-mile radius around a person's residence or place of employment or business). 
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jurisdiction, 288 explaining why Rule 4(k) addresses personal jurisdiction in the 
context of service. Thus, subdivisions (k) and (n) of Rule 4 both establish the 
jurisdictional reach of f ederal district courts, a function that is ultra vi res under 
the REA.289 
288. Omni Capital Int'!, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (" [S]ervice of 
summons is the procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of the suit asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served." ( quoting Miss. 
Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946))). 
289. Arguably, Rules 4(k) and 4(n) "limit the jurisdiction of the district courts," which is at 
odds with the declaration in Rule 82 that the Federal Rules do no such thing. FED. R. Civ. 
P. 82 ("These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue 
of actions in those courts."); see also Wash.-S. Navigation Co. v. Bait. & Phila. Steamboat 
Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924) (" [N]o rule of court can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction."). 
The intent behind Rule 82 was likely that the term "jurisdiction " meant federal subject­
matter jurisdiction. The Advisory Committee note to the 193 7 adoption of the rule stated, 
"These rules grant extensive power of joining claims and counterclaims in one action, but, 
as this rule states, such grant does not extend federal jurisdiction." FED. R. Civ. P. 82 
(1937) advisory committee's notes. However, the text of the rule does not make that 
specification, a fact noted by the Advisory Committee in its "Style Comment " 
accompanying the 2001 amendment to Rule 82: 
The recommendation that the change be made without publication carries 
with it a recommendation that style changes not be made. Styling would 
carry considerable risks. The first sentence of Rule 82, for example, states 
that the Civil Rules do not "extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United 
States district courts." That sentence is a flat lie if ''jurisdiction" includes 
personal or quasi-in rem jurisdiction. The styling project on this rule 
requires publication and comment. 
FED. R. Civ. P. 82 advisory committee's notes to 2001 amendment (emphasis added). 
Given the ambiguity, revising Rule 82 to specify subject-matter jurisdiction would be 
beneficial, although I am sure we could all continue to read Rule 82 in that way without 
too much peril. 
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2. Do Rules 4(k) and 4(n) Alter Substantive Rights? 
The requirement of personal jurisdiction derives principally from the 
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth290 and Fourteenth291 amendments, depending 
on whether federal or state court authority is at issue. A court must have personal 
jurisdiction because absent such jurisdiction, any judicial deprivations would be 
arbitrary and without due process of law.292 The content of this due process 
requirement, however, has been largely derived from notions of sovereignty: A 
person may not be bound by the pronouncements of a government with which it has 
no contacts.293 Any court that purported to exercise jurisdiction over persons (or 
property) under conditions not consistent with the demands of due process would 
be violating the person's or property owner's substantive right not to be deprived of 
property without due process of law. 
290. It is without question that the Fifth Amendment is the relevant provision that limits the territorial 
jurisdiction of the federal courts. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. W eltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 
619-20 (1992) (concluding that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause did not foreclose 
personal jurisdiction because the defendant had "purposefully avail[ ed] itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities withinthe [United States]") (citation omitted);Jn reChase& Sanborn Corp., 
835 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 1988) ("The due process clause of the fifth amendment constrains 
a federal court's power to acquire personal jurisdiction via nationwide service of process."), rev'd 
on other grounds sub. nom, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). However, the 
Supreme Court has not had occasion to define the precise contours of these limits. See Omni 
Capital, 484 U.S. at 102 n.5 (indicating there was no occasion in the case to address the scope of 
jurisdictional reach under the Fifth Amendment); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 
U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987) (plurality opinion) (same). Nonetheless, the Second, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eleventh, and Federal Circuits have done so, "and all agree that there is no meaningful difference 
in the level of contacts required for personal jurisdiction " under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 54-55 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ("The only 
difference in the personal-jurisdiction analysis under the two Amendments is the scope ofrelevant 
contacts: Under the Fourteenth Amendment, which defines the reach of state courts, the relevant 
contacts are state-specific. Under the Fifth Amendment, which defines the reach of federal courts, 
contacts with the United States as a whole are relevant."). 
291. See Int'! Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945) (applying the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to determine the scope of state court jurisdiction). 
292. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,733 (1877) ("[P]roceedings in a court ofjustice to determine the 
personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no jurisdiction do not 
constitute due process of law."); Spencer, supra note 69, at 625-26 ("This right of individuals to be 
protected against exercises of power in the absence of jurisdiction is a substantive due process 
right."); see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) ("[T]he Due Process Clause contains 
a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of 
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them."' (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 
327,331 (1986))). 
293. See Int'[ Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 ("That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a 
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no 
contacts, ties, or relations."). 
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Subdivisions (k) and (n) of Rule 4 do not assert jurisdiction over persons or 
property in contexts that would be wayward under the standards of due process. 
Rather, they restrict the jurisdictional reach of federal district courts by limiting 
personal jurisdiction to a subset of the circwnstances that the Fifth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause would otherwise permit.294 As such, no substantive rights of 
plaintiffs or defendants are altered. Although federal courts could exercise 
nationwide personal jurisdiction,295 there is no entitlement vested in plaintiffs for 
them to do so. Regarding defendants, so long as the jurisdictional reach of courts 
does not transgress outer constitutional limits, their rights are not abridged. Neither 
does restricting the territorial jurisdiction of some federal courts enlarge defendants' 
substantive rights; the underlying entitlements, duties, and obligations pertaining to 
their potential liability are not revised but, rather, the nwnber of federal courts that 
may take up the matter are limited. Thus, although these provisions are improperly 
jurisdictional, rather than procedural, they do not "abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right." 
3. Bringing Rule 4 Into Compliance With the REA 
As with Rule lS(c), the three routes to repairing Rule 4's REA violation are 
congressional enactment, abrogation, or an amendment confining the rule to 
service of process. The Supreme Court cannot define the territorial jurisdiction of 
the federal courts because Congress has not authorized the Court to make 
jurisdictional rules. Congress's own authority to do so is unquestioned. The way to 
294. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1977). The 
court writes: 
[W]hen a federal statute authorizes world-wide service of process . . .  the only 
relevant constraint is fifth amendment due process rather than statutory 
authorization. But not all federal statutes . . .  contain an additional provision 
granting such broad service of process powers. The Lanham Act, presently before 
us, apparently does not. [Thus,] the district court's power to exercise in personam 
jurisdiction is limited here to that provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and, through them, the laws of the state ofNevada . . . .  
Id. (citations omitted); see also Livnat, 851 F.3d at 55 (reflecting the view of circuits that have 
decided the question as being that " [u]nder the Fifth Amendment, which defines the reach of 
federal courts, contacts with the United States as a whole are relevant," as opposed to the relevant 
contacts having to be "state-specific " under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
295. See Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838) ("Whatever may be the extent of their 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of suits, in respect to persons and property; it can only be 
exercised within the limits of the [ federal judicial] district. Congress might have authorized civil 
process from any circuit court, to have run into any state of the Union. It has not done so."); see 
also Miss. Pub!' g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438,442 ( 1946) ("Congress could provide for service 
of process anywhere in the United States."); Robertson v. RR Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619,622 (1925) 
("Congress has power . . .  to provide that the process of every District Court shall run into every 
part of the United States."). 
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maintain the regulatory status quo without running afoul of the REA, then, would 
be to have Congress enact Rule 4(k) and Rule 4(n) legislatively. Such an approach 
would actually be a return to how the territorial jurisdiction of the federal courts was 
addressed originally; in Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress provided, 
"[NJ o civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts [ district or circuit] against 
an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in any other district than 
that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at the time of serving 
the writ."296 
The second approach, abrogation of Rule 4(k) and Rule 4(n), would obviously be 
more dramatic. Were abrogation to occur, Congress could step in to delimit the 
territorial jurisdiction of federal courts legislatively. In the absence of such a move, 
however, the only remaining limit on the territorial jurisdiction of federal courts 
would be constitutional, which-under the Fifth Amendment-would authorize 
personal jurisdiction over defendants having minimum contacts with the United 
States, that is, nationwide personal jurisdiction. 297 This result is based on my view 
that no affirmative statutory authorization is needed to empower the federal courts 
to exercise personal jurisdiction in the first place, 298 which some may regard to be an 
open question.299 Additionally, whether moving in the direction of nationwide 
296. Judiciary Act of l 789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. 
297. See FED R Civ. P. 4 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment ("The Fifth Amendment 
requires that any defendant have affiliating contacts with the United States sufficient to justify the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over that party." ( citing Wells Fargo & Co., 556 F.2d at 418) ). 
298. It is also based on my view that in the absence of any rule or statute addressing the territorial reach 
of federal courts, an Erie analysis would not compel courts to adhere to the jurisdictional 
constraints of their respective host states when state law is the basis for the claims. Because Erie is 
at least supposed to be an articulation of the constraints imposed by the Rules of Decision Act­
which requires the federal courts to applystate law as rules of decisions in cases where theyapply­
a state's jurisdictional rules should not be regarded as falling within that category. That said, I 
acknowledge the argument that the "twin aims" analysis articulated in Hanna suggests that 
ignoring state jurisdictional rules would lead to forum shopping and the inequitable 
administration of the laws, just as ignoring a forum state's conflicts rules was judged to have a like 
effect. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) ("The conflict of laws 
rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware's 
state courts. Otherwise the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal 
administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side."). 
299. I do not believe this is an open question. Imagine what the territorial reach of federal courts would 
be in the absence of any rule or statute that addressed the matter. Say there were no statute or rule 
authorizing personal jurisdiction in the federal courts, but there was subject matter jurisdiction. 
Every person in this countrywould be subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. courts if they 
were found here or if they were citizens of this country. What would stop the courts from having 
that power over such persons? One would have no basis to challenge their jurisdiction unless one 
was not a citizen, or one was not found in the United States, or-per International Shoe as applied 
to the Fifth Amendment -if one lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the United States. The 
lack of statutory authorization, to my mind, would be immaterial; I do not see anything beyond 
due process that would constrain the territorial reach of the federal courts in this scenario. In other 
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personal jurisdiction would be wise is a policy question, and one that is worthy of 
debate. I have previously defended this approach,300 and do so more fully in a 
separate forthcoming work.301 However, given the interests that repeat defendants 
( that is, corporations) have in the status quo,302 moving in this direction would likely 
be opposed vigorously from that quarter, making it too contentious for most 
rulemakers to suggest ( although I would be willing to give it a go). 
Finally, rather than outright abrogation of Rule 4(k), the Advisory Committee 
could modify it in a manner that returns the rule to its roots as a rule confined to the 
territorial reach of effective service. Rule 4(f)-the predecessor of Rule 4(k)(l)(A)­
originally read: "All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within 
the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held and, when a statute 
of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial limits of that state."303 Rule 
4(k) could be amended to address the limits of process, although in a manner that 
would not confine it to the territory of the forum state: 
(k) Territorial Limits of Effective Service. All process other than a 
subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of United 
States. Nothing in these Rules limits the personal jurisdiction of a district 
court. [deleting the remainder of the current text] 
In addition to this change, Rule 4(n) would still need to be abrogated (or 
congressionally enacted). Under these revisions, Rule 4 would not address personal 
jurisdiction at all; jurisdiction would be determined with reference to the Fifth 
Amendment, and to any laws Congress might enact addressed to the matter.304 
words, I do not think the federal courts need territorial jurisdiction conferred on them; 
jurisdiction flows directly from the power of the sovereign over people within ( or with minimum 
contacts with) its domain, though Congress certainly can limit it to a narrower scope. 
300. A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for our Federal Courts, 87 DENV. U. L. REv. 
325, 328 (2010) ("[I]f there are instances where the forum state cannot exercise personal jurisdiction 
over an individual, but a federal court within that state nonetheless would be a proper forum under 
applicable venue rules, the federal court's doors should be open to the dispute so long as exercising 
jurisdiction over the defendant would be constitutional with respect to the national sovereign."); 
id. at 329 (" [I]n most instances venue analysis is likely to identify federal districts to hear the action 
that will not present constitutionally undue burdens on defendants."). I grant that venue 
challenges can be waived by contract,Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court, 571 
U.S. 49,64 (2013), or procedural default, FED.R Ov. P.12(g)(2), (h)(l),meaning that there will be 
cases where the venue does not have any connection with the dispute. 
301 . A. Benjamin Spencer, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, 71 FIA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2019 ). 
302. There are also some repeat players representing the interests of plaintiffs, such as lobbying 
organizations and the plaintiffs' bar, who might advocate on behalf of such a change. 
303. FmR Ov.P.4(f) (1938). 
304. For a full discussion of my preferred revisions to Rule 4(k) and related considerations, see my 
forthcoming Article, The Territorial Reach of Federal Courts, supra note 301. 
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CONCLUSION 
Upon passage of the Rules Enabling Act, Charles E. Clark-who would later 
become the first reporter to the first Advisory Committee-and James W. Moore 
wrote, "It must be recognized that procedure is not an end in itself, but merely a means to 
an end, a tool rather than a product."305 This observation is instructive as one attempts 
to understand the meaning of the REA. Congress conferred on the Supreme Court 
the authority to craft rules of procedure. Tricky though it might be to pin down that 
term, its meaning must be set in some way for it to serve as a real guide to what it is 
Congress was permitting the Court to do. Understanding procedure as "merely a 
means to an end" gets us quite far in appreciating the term, for it focuses us on the 
means or method of adjudication, not whether a court may adjudicate, not by what 
criteria must it adjudicate, and not what consequences should flow from adjudication. 
Federal Rules that exceed this remit-or the more recently added remit to prescribe 
"rules of evidence" -must be labeled as ultra vires and revised, abrogated, or taken 
up by Congress to cure the violation. 
The alteration of substantive rights is also verboten under the REA. This does 
not mean the incidental impact that all rules are acknowledged to have is 
problematic.306 Rather, the Supreme Court's rules cannot alter those rights-which 
can occur through impingement, augmentation, redefinition, or adulteration. 
Taking this prohibition seriously means being sensitive to substantive rights created 
by state and federal law and soberly ascertaining the consequence that application of 
the Federal Rule will have for said rights. If the impact of the rule with respect to the 
right is "now you see me, now you don't," our suspicion that the rule has gone too far 
should be piqued. An affirmative defense's disappearance through the hocus pocus 
of a federal relation-back rule is the kind of impingement on rights that should be 
treated as suspect. 
Problems such as these are easy to ignore or interpret away. Unfortunately, 
doing so diminishes the integrity of the Federal Rules and the rulemaking enterprise. 
Confronting the wayward rules I have identified above will be a difficult and 
unwelcome endeavor for the rulemakers, but it is a task I think we must embrace. If 
we at least engage in the discussion, one product could be a more refined and 
transparent articulation of the REA' s strictures, making it a better guide to 
305. Charles E. Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 392 
(1935). 
306. See Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) ("Undoubtedly most alterations of 
the rules of practice and procedure may and often do affect the rights of litigants. Congress' 
prohibition of any alteration of substantive rights oflitigants was obviously not addressed to such 
incidental effects."). 
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rulemaking going forward. I am hopeful that some part of this revivified 
engagement with the REA will be taken up so that the proper division between 
judicial and legislative regulatory authority can be restored. 
